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TAXING THE FAMILY WORK: AID
FOR AFFLUENT HUSBAND CARE
MARTHA T. MCCLUSKEY*
ABSTRACT
The income of the classic breadwinner married to a
homemaker receives a tax advantage under federal income tax
law. The conventional wisdom holds that any resulting inequities
to unmarried persons or dual-earning marriages cannot be
corrected without producing similarly problematic inequities.
This Article challenges that dilemma by analyzing the inequity of
the marital tax system from a new perspective. This Article
argues that the perceived "bonus" for breadwinner-homemaker
marriages is best understood as an implicit policy of "aid for
affluent husband care." Recent tax reforms (up for renewal in
2010) that partly reduced the "marriage penalty "for some dual-
earning couples are inequitable not simply because these
reforms exclude upper-income and lower-income marriages
while penalizing single persons. More fundamentally, this Article
shows how these tax reforms increase a regressive system of
support for the family caretaking labor on which income earning
depends. This Article aims to show how a change to
individualized, more progressive rates could more equitably
treat income earning and informal caretaking labor regardless
offamily status.
INTRODUCTION
How should family status affect income taxes? In 2001,
Congress began a series of changes to federal income tax law
aimed at reducing the so-called "marriage penalty" on dual-
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earning middle class income tax payers. ' These marriage tax
reforms, set to expire in 2010 under a sunset provision, 2 enjoy
continuing approval across the political spectrum. 3 The reforms
reduced taxes for many dual-earning married couples by
*Professor of Law and William J. Magavem Faculty Scholar, State
University of New York at Buffalo. This Article benefited from discussions of
earlier versions and related work at conferences and workshops at Washington
University, the University of Toronto Law School, Hofstra University Law
School, the University of Connecticut Law School, Harvard Law School, the
University of Texas Law School, the University at Buffalo Law School, and the
University of Maine Law School, as well as at the Law and Society Association
2002 Annual Meeting and the Association of American Law Schools 2001
Annual Meeting's Sociocconomics session. I am particularly grateful for
comments on ideas in this paper by. Lisa Philipps, Jeremy Paul, Janet Halley,
and Duncan Kennedy. Special thanks to Martha Fineman and the Feminism and
Legal Theory Workshop for numerous insightful discussions of these issues,
and to Lucinda Finley for sparking and supporting my initial interest in this
topic.
'Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 10716, § 301, 115 Stat. 38, 45 (2001) (gradually expanding the fifteen
percent tax bracket and standard deduction for married taxpayers) [hereinafter
EGTRRA]; The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 10827, 117 Stat. 252 (2003) (accelerating those marital tax changes)
[hereinafter JGTRRA]; Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub, L. No.
108311, 118 Stat. 1166 (2004) (extending the marriage penalty reforms of
EGTRRA and JGTRRA through 2010).
2 See EGTRRA supra note I, § 901(a).
3 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Now That Rich, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008, at
19 (noting that despite some disagreement on tax policy, presidential candidates
Obama and McCain both agreed on retaining the Bush administration marriage
tax reforms); JAMES R. HORNEY, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, AN
ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE BUDGET PLANS, Apr. I, 2009 (noting that
the budget plans of the House, Senate and President all agreed on retaining the
Bush administration's marriage tax cuts).
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increasing what has been called the "marriage bonus. ' 4 That
bonus, however, does not go to all married taxpayers. Instead, it
particularly directs tax benefits toward relatively affluent
breadwinners married to spouses with relatively little or no
market earnings. That is, the tax system privileges the traditional
-and traditionally white, male, and heterosexual-family
provider married to a homemaker. 5 By analyzing this recently
enhanced marital tax preference as "aid for affluent husband
care," this Article reveals problems with the recent marriage tax
reforms and the longstanding marital tax system. Instead, the tax
system should be changed to support caretaking for workers
regardless of family status.
Tax scholarship and popular commentary have extensively
criticized the inequities resulting from past and present
4 See Susan Kalinka, Highlights of the 2003 Jobs Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act: Economic Stimulus Or Long-Term Disaster?, LA. L. REV.,
Winter 2004, at 219, 223-32 (explaining the marriage bonus resulting from
reduced marriage penalties); Lawrence Zclenak, Marriage and the Income Tax,
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 340 (1994) (explaining the marriage bonus as the degree
of income splitting created by the tax rates applied to joint marital tax returns);
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 16-18, tbl. 4 (1997) (explaining how
the joint marital tax rates in effect from 1948 through the late 1990s created a
bonus for traditional breadwinner-homemaker marriage while marriage brings
penalties or no tax change for equal-earning couples ).
5 See Wendy Richards, An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms from a Marital-
Bias Perspective: It is Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008 Wis. L.
REV. 611, 617 (explaining how the recent marriage reforms perpetuated the tax
system's bias toward traditional breadwinner-homemaker families); Dorothy A.
Brown, The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate: Legislative Issues in Black and
White, 16 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 287, 295-96 (1999) (explaining how at
every level of income, a smaller percentage of married African-Americans than
married white couples receive marriage bonuses); Beverly 1. Moran & William
Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. REV.
751, 791-99 (exploring the marriage penalty as part of an analysis of race in tax
policy).
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marriage-linked tax penalties 6 and bonuses. 7 These inequities
have been heightened as demographic change has eroded the
tax-favored breadwinner-homemaker marriage both as an ideal
and as an empirical reality.8 Why has such a seemingly outdated
and inequitable marriage-based tax scheme not only endured but
also gained so much political ground while alternative policies
remain off the table of serious examination and debate?
This Article argues that a different analytical lens would
help clarify the persisting problems of principle and politics
grounding current marriage tax policy. In the classic framework,
family taxation poses an inescapable dilemma between
"marriage neutrality" and "married couples equality."9 On the
6 See generally Adam Carasso & C. Eugene Steuerlc, The Hefty Penalty
on Marriage Facing Many Households with Children, 15 THE FUTURE OF CHILD.
157 (2005) (explaining that "huge" penalties on marriage persist for lower
income earers despite recent reforms); see also Edward J. McCaffery,
Marriage-Penalty Reform Still Has Long Way to Go, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, May
26, 2003, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI05398237190213100.html (last
visited July 5, 2010) (explaining that the law retains "marriage penalties" for
upper and lower income dual-earning married taxpayers); Sue Shellenbarger, Ask
The Juggle: Dealing with the Marriage Penalty and Taxes, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
Feb. 25, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2009/02/25/ask-the-juggle-dealing-
with-the-marriage-penalty-and-taxes (last visited Feb. 16 2010) (discussing tax
disadvantages of marriage for some dual-eaming couples with joint incomes
over $132,000 despite recent reforms).
7 See Shari Motro, A New "I Do ": Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income
Tax, 91 IowA L. REv. 1509, 1513-30 (2006) (arguing that functional economic
unity, not formal marriage, would be a more equitable basis for the tax system's
income-splitting "bonus"); Brown, supra note 5 (showing that the tax system's
"marriage bonus" is racially skewed in favor of white.married couples because it
does not apply to the dual-earning patterns predominant among African
Americans); Federal Income Taxes, CURRENT ISSUES (Alternatives to Marriage
Project) July 3, 2009, http://www.unmarried.org/federal-income-taxes.html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2010) (explaining that the income tax bonus for married couples
means two similarly-earning workers can get different take-home pay for the
same work because unmarried persons are denied the tax benefits of marital
income splitting).
8 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE
AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 38-40 (June 1997) (analyzing labor market and
demographic changes affecting distribution of marriage-based penalties and
bonuses).
I Zelenak, supra note 4, at 342.
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surface, both of these principles seem to be reasonable measures
of equitable taxation. "Marriage neutrality" holds that
individuals with the same income should be taxed the same
regardless of marital status, while "married couples' equality"
holds that married couples with the same joint income should be
taxed the same regardless of individual income distribution
within the marriage. From this perspective, the current system of
marriage-linked bonuses and penalties represents one of several
historic policy attempts to weigh these two seemingly competing
goals.'0 Major change in the family tax system appears neither
intellectually nor practically compelling in the face of what
conventional tax wisdom treats as an insolvable conflict among
equities.
But this apparent dilemma of equities dissolves when one
more precisely analyzes how homemaking wives' unpaid
caretaking labor provides "affluent husband care." Tax
scholarship has discussed the problem of failing to count the
traditional homemaker's unpaid labor as income for tax
purposes. I This Article shifts that discussion to examine
informal domestic labor as a gain to the traditional breadwinning
husband. This change in focus shows that the "married couples'
equality" principle is flawed because it fails to give normal tax
recognition to the market income of primary breadwinning
husbands, not because it fails to give special tax recognition to
informal homemaking.
Discussions of family tax policy tend to be obscured by the
assumption that homemaking wives' unpaid caretaking goes
mainly to dependents. Instead, this Article considers how tax
policy addresses family caretaking for breadwinning husbands,
that is, those typically identified as quintessentially independent
10 See Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something about Marriage Penalties: A
Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAx L. REV. I, 4-8 (2000).
11 See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 1389, 1426 (1975) (framing the problem as the failure to tax imputed
income); JULIE A. NELSON, FEMINISM, OBJECTIVITY & ECONOMICS 104-05
(1996) (explaining how tax policy and theories of marriage taxation ignore and
misconstrue household production).
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providers for others. 12 This shift in frame reveals that the
affluent breadwinner-homemaker family form often held out as
the model of self-sufficiency instead relies on special
government tax support amounting to over thirty billion dollars a
year. 13
Furthermore, that dollar amount exceeds the level of
government spending on the classic former family welfare
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 14
suggesting a policy preference for "aid for affluent husband
care." AFDC's support for low-income single parent familieswas
replaced in 1996 with a new system centered on the goal of
moving impoverished single mothers from informal family
caretaking to formal market work. 15 That welfare policy change
narrowing public support for unpaid caretaking in low-income
families contrasts with the recent expansion of tax support for
unpaid caretaking by middle and upper income married
homemakers.
Though this Article joins others criticizing the unfairness of
this tax privilege for breadwinners with homemaking spouses, it
takes this criticism in a new direction by advocating further
expansion, rather than elimination, of tax aid for family
caretaking of breadwinners. All income earners, not just those
with substantial income and not just those married to non-
12 See Martha T. McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 55 ME. L. REv. 317
(2003) (discussing family caretaking for non-dcpcndents).
13 Jane G. Gravelle, Federal Income Tax Treatment of the Family 19-24
(CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS ORDER CODE RL 33755,
Dec. 19, 2006) (discussing various calculations of the marriage bonus over time
and based on different assumptions of a couples' income with and without
marriage).
14 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 318 (2001) (citing H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
GREEN BOOK, at 447-48, tbls.8-15 (1996)) (noting that in the early 1990s the
annual government spending on AFDC was $22 billion).
15 See Martha T. McCluskey, The Politics of Economics in Welfare
Reform, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW AND
SOCIETY 193, 193-224 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds.,
2005) (summarizing these reforms and critiquing the economic rationales for
them).
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earners or low-eamers, deserve more substantial tax support for
the caretaking costs related to market labor. Though the current
system of "aid to affluent husbands" is highly inequitable, it
correctly recognizes that producing and maintaining successful
market earnings typically requires substantial resources, both
monetary and non-monetary. Family tax policy does not require
a choice between favoring wives' (or others') formal market
earnings over informal family caretaking (or unpaid leisure).
Instead, replacing the current system of "aid for affluent husband
care" with equitable tax support for breadwinner care could lead
to more equitable and effective support for informal family
caretakers as well.
Fair tax support for breadwinner care could be achieved
through a policy change to individual taxation of work income
combined with increased progressivity. By identifying the goal
as fair tax support for all breadwinners, in place of "aid to
affluent husbands," this Article aims to further clarify and
develop existing arguments for an individualized tax system.
The political resilience of the tax preference for relatively
affluent breadwinner-homemaker marriages is partly a problem
of an ideological frame that, intentionally or not, limits
imagination about alternative schemes by obscuring the
contested values and politics on which the marital tax scheme
depends. By identifying this tax break as "aid for affluent
husband care," this Article links the current inequities to specific
political interests and social values, not just formal tax principles
or the technical complexities of adapting the tax system to social
change. Furthermore, this framework turns the moral and
political debate away from the deeply divisive questions of
whether to favor "marriage" at the expense of single individuals,
to support "working wives" at the expense of full-time
homemakers or to support tax relief for dual-earning
professional married couples at the expense of struggling
"traditional" breadwinner-homemaker families with modest
incomes. Instead, by redefining the reform goal as more
equitable aid for breadwinner care in general, this Article shows
how the majority of workers and family caretakers would benefit
from rejecting the current marriage tax scheme.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
Finally, by identifying the family tax system as a problem
of support for "affluent husband care," this Article aims to
clarify broader issues of tax policy and ideology. The recent
marital tax reforms are perhaps most significant not for their
increased subsidy to higher-earning "husbands," but for their
political role in leveraging upper-middle class support for much
more lavish tax cuts directed at the very rich. 16 Underlying the
marriage tax debate is the bigger question of how to treat the
costs of producing monetary gains. Who deserves to command
public and private support for their economic production, and
whose economic production should be directed toward serving
others' gains?
The history and continuing operation of the family tax
system, viewed through the lens of "aid for affluent husband
care," shows how tax policy has singled out the market work of
the paradigmatic affluent white married man for special support.
Taken in context of the recent upper-class tax cuts, the recent
marriage tax reforms may represent a shift toward an ideal
privileging the wealthiest as the quintessential producers of
societal gain, and therefore those most deserving of public
support. 17 By replacing the current marriage tax system with a
fairer system of tax support for the costs of work, we could take
a step toward a different vision. Reforming tax "aid for affluent
husband care" could help advance an idea of economic well-
being and fairness based on workers' ability to care and earn for
themselves, their families and their communities.
This Article begins by comparing two breadwinners, one
married to a homemaker and one single, to show how the tax
preference works. It then explains how this preference is better
16Lawrence A. Zclcnak, The Declining Progressivity of the Federal
Income Tax, in LAW AND CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR
163, 182-83 (Paul D. Carrington & Trina Jones eds., 2006) (explaining that
marriage penalty reforms were part of three small tax reductions that appear to
have bought off the middle class in the interest of major tax cuts for the
wealthy).
7See Martha T. McCluskey, Razing the Citizen: Economic Inequality
Gender, and Marriage Tax Reform, in, GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF
WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 267 (Linda McClain & Joanna Grossman, eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) (discussing marriage tax policy in the context of
ideas about gender, economic class, and citizenship).
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understood as tax aid for affluent husband care, rather than as a
"marriage bonus." Putting this "husband care" tax support in
context, the Article draws on accounts of contemporary
marriage, labor market data and family law history to show that
the income tax system reinforces a broader policy system relying
on valuable unpaid "husband care." Part 1I analyzes the
conventional rationales for this tax preference, first using the
lens of "affluent husband care" to challenge the standard
assumptions about the difference between married and single
primary breadwinners. This Article then shows how a focus on
"husband care" also sharpens our view of the equities in
comparing the married primary breadwinner to breadwinners in
dual-breadwinning marriages and to unmarried breadwinners
with dependents. Part III considers how the recent marriage tax
reforms build on past changes in marriage taxation to advance
and exacerbate the longstanding problem of tax aid for affluerit
husband care. Part IV offers a solution to the inequities of the
marital tax system that involves, first, individual taxation of
work income and, second, increased progressivity. This Article
concludes by suggesting that though this solution would provide
fairer tax support for breadwinners and for their caretakers, it
should be seen as part of a broader policy shift toward public
support for more family providers and family caretakers.
I. Marital Income Splitting As Aid For Affluent Husband
Care
A. Aid for Married Primary Breadwinners
1. Breadwinner Bob Gets a Bonus
Imagine a taxpayer, Breadwinner Bob, who has recently
graduated from law school to begin work as an attorney earning
$100,000 a year. As a single earner, his $100,000 in wage
income would have given him a 2008 federal income tax bill of
$19,472, assuming a simplified return with no non-wage income
and a standard deduction. 18
8 Assuming an adjusted gross income of $100,000, a personal exemption
of $3500, and a standard deduction of $5450, taxable income would be $91,472,
producing a tax of $19,472 under 2008 rates for single filing individuals.
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Let's assume that after about a year on the job, Bob marries
his college sweetheart Hannah, who quits her job teaching
elementary school in another state to move in with Bob. After
considering Bob's long work hours and the local job market for
teachers, the couple decides that, for now, Hannah will remain
out of the formal workforce and focus instead on taking care of
their home life.
As they file their federal tax return covering their first tax
year as a married couple, Bob is happy to realize that his new
status as husband of Homemaker Hannah reduces his 2008 taxes
to $13,213, for a tax savings of $6259 compared to what he
would have paid as a single filer, assuming a simplified return.' 9
Bob reflects that having a homemaking spouse has not only
brought him this annual tax bonus, but also has improved his
quality of life and his economic well-being in many ways.
Although his income now covers Hannah's living expenses as
well as his own, he spends less money on outside domestic
services like restaurant meals, laundry and housecleaning. In
addition, Hannah's time spent on careful bargain hunting helps
Bob save money on food, household goods and professional
clothes. Hannah's homemaking also includes renovating,
decorating and landscaping the couple's newly purchased house,
and these improvements are likely to enhance their property's
19 Assuming an adjusted gross income of $100,000, personal exemptions
of $7000, and standard deduction of S 10,900, the tax would be $13,213 under
2008 rates for jointly filing married persons. Of course, it is likely that Bob and
Hannah would have potentially deductible expenses from home ownership, such
as home mortgage interest and property taxes. However, those home expenses
are deductible only if a taxpayer makes itemized deductions instead of taking the
standard deduction. The generosity of the marital standard deduction ($10,900),
increased under the recent marriage tax reforms, means that this standard
deduction might be the best option for many married breadwinners. The average
home mortgage interest deduction per return for taxpayers in the $100,000-
199,999 bracket in 2003 was under $9000. See Gerald Prantc, Fiscal Fact No.
49," THE TAX FOUNDATION, Feb. 6, 2006, available at http://
www.taxfoundation.org/rcscarch/show/1341 .html.
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investment value. 20 Further, marriage to Homemaker Hannah
has helped Bob nurture some important professional
connections, as she has organized parties and dinners to entertain
Bob's colleagues and clients on several occasions.
Having a spouse focused primarily on homemaking has
also improved Bob's leisure time. He recalls his first year as a
single law firm associate when he would come home in the
evening after a ten to twelve hour work day facing errands, an
empty fridge, dishes in the sink, bills to pay and general
domestic disorder. Now, he can put in a long day at the office
and know that Hannah will keep most home chores under
control.2' Hannah also has time during the week to develop the
couple's social connections, to arrange medical appointments, 22
plan recreational activities and to otherwise help Bob relax and
recharge from the stresses of his long and demanding work
week.23
Despite these benefits from their breadwinner-homemaker
division of labor, Bob and Hannah are concerned that Bob's long
work hours and lack of home involvement will put stress on
their marriage and personal satisfaction, especially if they were
20 See, e.g., Karen A. Stansbury, Should Homemakers Keep Time Sheets?
The Definition of "Contribution to Marriage" under Connecticut Law,
PROFESSIONAL WOMEN'S ALLIANCE OF CONNECTICUT (Dec. 13, 2009) http://
pwa-ct.com/2009/12/I 3/should-homemakers-kcep-time-shects-thc-dcfinition-of-
%E2%80%9Ccontribution-to-the-marriage%E2%80%9D-undcr-connecticut-
law/ (discussing how a homemaking wife in a divorce case could document her
gardening and maintenance work as potential evidence of her contribution to the
value of the marital home).
21 See PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT? WHY WOMEN REALLY QUIT
CAREERS AND HEAD HOME 77 (2007) (describing how brcadwinning husbands
with egalitarian values nonetheless may prefer homemaking wives because of
the difficulties of managing household chores after long work days); see also
infra notes 97-99.
22 See infra note 108.
23 For a discussion of the often overlooked aspects of valuable household
services by spouses, see Frank D. Tinari, Household Services: Toward a More
Comprehensive Measure, II J. FORENSIC ECONOMISTS 253 (1998) (arguing for
greater valuation for homemakers' services in wrongful death cases).
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to raise children. 24 They also are concerned that if Hannah
remains out of the workforce for long her earnings potential will
soon erode significantly.25 They realize they may need also her
income in case of rising living expenses, setbacks in Bob's
career or other crises. 26
2. Single Sophia Gets None
Now imagine that Bob has an unmarried law school
classmate, Single Sophia, who gets a job at the same law firm as
Bob. She is also paid $100,000 a year and similarly works long
hours in hopes of making partner in a few years. From Sophia's
$100,000 income, filing as a single taxpayer she will owe
$19,472 in 2008 federal income taxes, just like Bob would have
before his marriage, provided she has no non-wage income and
has a simplified return with standard exemptions and
deductions. 27 But when she compares her tax bill to Bob's after
his marriage, she is surprised to find that he now pays $6259 less
in taxes despite making the same income. 28
Comparing her available spending money and leisure time
with Bob's, Single Sophia feels that her higher tax burden is
unfair. Although she does not support another household
member, she pays for many domestic services to support her
24 See FRANCINE M. DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: How EQUALLY SHARED
PARENTING WORKS, 229 (1999) (explaining how equal sharing can further
marital and parental intimacy compared to breadwinner-homemaker marriages).
25 See JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, UNIV. OF
CAL., HASTINGS, "OPT-OUT" OR PUSHED OUT HOW THE PRESS COVERS WORK/
FAMILY CONFLICT 15-16 (2006) (explaining the often overlooked difficulties
women face in retuming to the workforce after periods of homemaking).
26 See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS & FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 55-70
(2003) (explaining how the homemaking wife has served as a safety net for one-
earner middle-class families).
27 See supra note 18 (giving calculations for single filing taxpayer under
2008 rates).
28 For a further discussion of tax policy's unfair disadvantages toward
single persons, see Lily Kahng, One is the Loneliest Number: The Single
Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L. J. 651 (2010).
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busy work schedule, including housecleaning, professional
laundering, frequent restaurant meals and yard work.
Nonetheless, Single Sophia finds that her free time is often
consumed by additional domestic tasks like taking care of
household bills, shopping and car maintenance. After spending
many late weeknights and weekends either at work or on home
chores, Single Sophia is hard pressed to find time or energy for
organizing social events with friends and family, much less for
pursuing romantic relationships or for developing professional
connections. She also worries that her long work hours will take
a toll on her health and well-being. Despite her income and lack
of dependents, she still has trouble controlling her credit card
debt as well as saving for a cushion against possible future
interruptions or transitions in her career.
3. Income Splitting Bonus for Married Primary
Breadwinners
How does married Bob get an annual tax bonus that might
exceed $6000 compared to single Sophia despite their identical
income? Two aspects of the tax code work together to give
Breadwinner Bob this tax break for marrying Homemaker
Hannah: joint marital taxation and the marital rate structure.
First, since 1948 the United States tax system has treated
married couples as a unit by combining their income. 29 This joint
taxation system differs from the system of individual income
taxation in the United States prior to 1948 and used in many
other countries, although such systems may include various
adjustments based on family status. 30 Second, along with joint
taxation, in 1948 the United States also adopted a separate tax
29 See infra Part Ill (discussing historical development of "aid for afflucnt
husband care").
10 See generally Joseph A. Pechman & Gary V. Engelhardt, The Income
Tax Treatment of the Family: An International Perspective, 43 NAT'L TAX J. I
(1990) (noting that France, Germany and the Untied States have been in the
minority of nations that fail to tax married couples as individuals at least to some
extent).
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rate for married couples that treats marital income as if it were
divided between the spouses. 31
Under a (simplified) individual tax system, Bob would
report $100,000 in income while Hannah would have $0 taxable
income. But under the longstanding joint marital taxation, Bob
is effectively taxed as if Hannah earned part of his income. Their
income is taxed in the aggregate-as a marital unit-and the tax
rates applied to that unit operate to treat that aggregate income
as if it were divided between two individual earners.
This "income-splitting" matters because the tax rates are
progressive: as income increases, a greater portion of that
income is taxed. Under 2008 rates an individual earning
$100,000 gets taxed at $19,472 (assuming a simplified tax
return), but two single workers earning $50,000 a year would
pay roughly $6606 each, for a combined tax of $13, 212,
producing a tax savings of over six thousand dollars on the same
total income of $100,000.32
Progressive tax rates arguably reflect the idea that
individuals have a greater ability to pay as their income rises: the
ninety-thousandth dollar of income earned is less valuable to the
individual-and therefore more fairly shared with the
community through taxation-than the nine thousandth dollar.33
The first portion of individual income is essentially untaxed
through the personal exemption and standard deduction,
arguably recognizing that a person should be allowed to keep an
initial portion of their earnings for very basic living expenses
31 See Motro, supra note 7, at 1560-68 (illustrating the history and
workings of income-splitting); Zelenak, supra note 4, at 339-40 (explaining the
income-splitting effect of progressive joint taxation).
32 Again, this tax amount assumes no dependents and no deductions or
credits other than standard deduction of $5450 and personal exemption of $3500
and assuming only wage income, producing taxable income of $41,050.
33 See generally Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and
the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905
(1987) (using contemporary dominant economic ideology to analyze theoretical
merits of progressive taxation); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalvcn, Jr., The Uneasy
Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952) (giving the classic
theory of progressive taxation).
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before being required to share income with society in general.34
Once income exceeds that basic tax-free threshold, tax rates are
graduated so that income above certain levels gets taxed at a
higher rate. Through these graduated tax rates, along with the
tax-free income offset by the standard deduction and personal
exemptions, each individual gets some "breaks" on the portion
of their earnings that represents low and modest income-a "ride
up the tax bracket." 35
The marital income-splitting system benefits breadwinner-
homemaker couples like Bob and Hannah because an affluent
breadwinner can essentially "shelter" income by shifting it to the
non-earning or substantially lower-earning spouse and thereby
take advantage of the tax breaks given to lower individual
earning. In other words, married breadwinner-homemaker
couples get a bonus of "two rides up the tax brackets,"3 6 because
they are taxed as if they were two individuals with lower
earnings, rather than one individual with higher earnings. By
marrying a non-earner, Breadwinner Bobgets the benefit of a
$50,000 earner's more progressive tax rates despite earning
$100,000.
This tax shelter is not available to all, or even to most,
married breadwinners and, as such, the typical description of it
as a "marriage bonus" is misleading. More precisely, this tax
bonus primarily works to shelter the income of relatively
affluent breadwinners with non-earning or low-earning spouses.
That is, the income-splitting tax scheme works to benefit a
special subset of marriages or, viewed from another angle, of
breadwinners. Though not strictly accurate, calling this tax
benefit a "marriage bonus" may appear to be a logical way of
explaining its social significance. However, more precise
34 In 2009, for example, the tax code allows a single person (under age
sixty-five) a standard deduction of $5700 and a personal exemption of $3650, for
a total of $9350 of tax-free income. I.R.S. Publ'n 501 (Dec. 18, 2009), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5O I.pdf. This amount is just under the federal
poverty threshold of $10,830 for a single person. Annual Update of the HHS
Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199-04, 4200 (proposed Jan. 23, 2009).
35 See MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 14-15, 32 (discussing the relationship
between tax brackets and joint marital taxation).
36 1d. at 32.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
analysis reveals that this tax provision fits a broader pattern of
socio-legal support not for marriage per se but for a traditional
paradigm of "husband care."
B. Not a "Marriage Bonus"
1. Excludes Low-Income Marriage
First, this income-splitting bonus from marital rates is not
available to low-income married couples. To benefit from a tax
shelter, the breadwinner's earnings must exceed taxable income
levels. Nearly forty percent of individual tax units (including
single filers and households) earn incomes below taxable levels,
and the majority of those with less than $30,000 in annual
income have no tax liability.37 Nearly two-thirds of taxpayers in
2006 paid more in payroll taxes than in income taxes. 38 Lower
income couples with dependent children are particularly unlikely
to experience income-splitting as a bonus for marriage. At
income levels below about $40,000, for most taxpayers with
children any tax advantages from marriage are more than offset
by the negative impact of marriage on eligibility for transfer
programs such as food stamps and government health
insurance. 39
2. Targets One-Breadwinner Marriage
Second, to "shelter" income through this marital tax
system, an income-earner needs to have a spouse with
substantially lower (or no) taxable earnings, so that income-
37 See TAX POLICY CENTER, T-08-0208, DISTRIBUTION OF TAX UNITS
WITH ZERO OR NEGATIVE INCOME TAX LIABILITY BY CASH INCOME LEVEL, 2009,
(2008), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/displayatab.cfm?
Docid=1 973&DocTypclD=7.
38LEN BURMAN & GREG LEISERSON, TAX POLICY CTR., TwO-THIRDS OF
TAX UNITS PAY MORE PAYROLL TAX THAN INCOME TAX (2007), available at
http://taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001065 Tax Units.pdf.
39 See Carasso & Steucrie, supra note 6, at 159, 169 fig. 3. Although the
EITC rewards low earnings with a refundable tax benefit, offsetting some of the
potential tax gains of marriage to a higher earner for many low-earners, at very
low income levels (below about $10,000) EITC eligibility levels are expanded
for married couples, producing an income-splitting bonus for marriage. Id.
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shifting between taxpayers has a tax impact. 40 If a breadwinner
marries a spouse with equal or higher taxable income, that
spouse will have already fully used their tax breaks for their own
income. For example, if Bob's law school classmate Dominic
has a public interest law job eaming $50,000 and he marries
Daniela, who also earns $50,000, Dominic will not receive a tax
break after marriage. Dominic and Daniela both would already
have been taxed at the lower rates applicable to $50,000 earners,
and both would have already used their personal exemption and
standard deduction, so that (unlike Bob and Hannah) dividing
their combined income in half will have no tax impact. Both will
continue to pay the same taxes after marriage as before (other
things being equal).
To benefit from marital income splitting, one spouse must
earn at least sixty percent of the marital income. The greatest
benefits go to married breadwinners who earn all or virtually all
of the marital income. For example, if Breadwinner Bob earns
$90,000 and Homemaker Hannah earns $10,000, their annual
gain from filing as married rather than single earners would be
$334641 compared to the $6259 tax savings for marriage if
Breadwinner Bob earns one hundred percent of the couple's
$100,000 income. The marital income-splitting benefit is
lessened as spousal incomes become more equal. If Bob earned
$80,000 and Hannah earned $20,000, their tax gain from
40 See MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 16 tbl. 2, 18 (explaining that equal-
earning married couples receive no benefit or penalty under a tax system in
which marginal marital rates are double marginal individual rates).
4' Based on 2008 rates and a simplified return with standard deduction
and no dependents, a $90,000 single filing earner would have $81,050 taxable
income for a tax of $16,672, and a $10,000 single filing earner would have
taxable income of S 1050 for a tax of $105, offset by an earned income credit of
$218 for a net credit of $113, resulting in a combined tax of $16,559 as two
single filing taxpayers. As married jointly filing taxpayers with combined income
of $10O,000, their tax liability of $13,213 gives them a tax savings of $3346
upon marriage.
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marriage would be reduced to $2146 a year.42 If Breadwinner
Bob earned $60,000 and Homemaker Hannah earned $40,000,
they would get an annual bonus of only $150 as a married
couple filing jointly, compared to what they would owe as single
filers. 43 If Bob earned $55,000 and Hannah earned $45,000, they
would owe the same combined taxes as single filing taxpayers as
they would as a jointly filing married couple.44
At more modest income levels, the division of spousal
income generally needs to be even more unequal to reap
substantial benefits from the income-splitting marriage bonus,
again partly because of the countervailing protection for low
earners from the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). With the
most unequal division of income, a single breadwinner earning
$50,000 would get a tax savings of $2593 simply for jointly
filing with a spouse with zero income. 45 If a couple had the same
total income but split earnings $40,000 and $10,000, after taking
into account an EITC refund for the lower earner, the couple's
42 Based on 2008 rates and a simplified return with a standard deduction
and no dependents, a single filing individual earning $80,000 would have taxable
income of $71,050 for a tax of $14,106, and a single filing individual earning
$20,000 would have taxable income of $11,050 for a tax of $1256, for a
combined tax bill of $15,358 for the unmarried couple compared to the tax of
$13,212 for a married couple filing jointly with $ 100,000 income and the same
assumptions.
43 Based on 2008 rates and a simplified return with a standard deduction
and no dependents, a singly filing individual earning $60,000 would have taxable
income of $51,050 producing a tax of $9106; a singly filing individual earning
$40,000 would have taxable income of $31,050 producing a tax of $4256, for a
combined tax on the unmarried couple of $13,362 compared to the $13,212 tax
on a married couple filing jointly with income of $ 100,000.
" Based on simplified tax returns with standard deductions and no
dependents, a single eamer with $55,000 in wages would have taxable income of
$46,050, for a tax of $7856; and a single earner with $45,000 in wages would
have a taxable income of $36,050 for a tax of $5356.
45 Based on 2008 rates and a simplified return with a standard deduction
and no dependents, a singly filing individual earning $50,000 would have a
taxable income of $41,050 with a tax of $6606; after marriage to a non-camer, as
a jointly filing married couple with $50,000 income the tax would be $4013.
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tax gain from marriage would be $356.46 And two taxpayers
earning $50,000 in combined income with split earnings of
$30,000 and $20,000 would get a marriage bonus of one dollar
(other things being equal). 47
Sole-breadwinner families who reap the greatest benefit
from marital income-splitting are a relatively small group of
working-age married couples. In 2008, only about one-quarter of
married couples fit the one-breadwinner model in which only
one spouse was employed. 48 In just over half of marriages, both
spouses are employed.49 In 2005, wives earned an average of
thirty-five cents of every dollar of married couples' income. 50
46 Based on 2008 rates and a simplified return with a standard deduction
and no dependents, a singly filing individual earning $40,000 would have taxable
income of $31,050 producing a tax of $4256 and a $10,000 single filing earner
would have taxable income of $1050 for a tax of $105, offset by an earned
income credit of $218 for a net credit of $113, producing a combined tax on the
unmarried couple of $4369, compared to $4013 for a married couple filing
jointly with income of $50,000 (which produces taxable income of $32,100 after
marital standard deduction and two personal exemptions).
47 Based on 2008 rates and a simplified return with a standard deduction
and no dependents, a singly filing individual earning $30,000 would have a
taxable income of $21,050 with a tax of $2756 and a single filing individual
earning $20,000 would have taxable income of $11,050 with a tax of $1256,
producing a combined tax for the unmarried couple of $4012, compared to a tax
of $4013 for a married couple filing jointly with income of $50,000 (which
produces taxable income of $32,100 after marital standard deduction and two
personal exemptions).
48. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF
FAMILIES IN 2007 (2009) http://www.bls.gov/news.relcasc/famce.htm (counting
19.5% of marriages in which only the husband was employed, and 6.9% of
marriages in which only the wife was employed, for a total of 26.4% of one-
breadwinner heterosexual marriages).
49 M,.
5o BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CHARTING THE U.S. LABOR MARKET IN
2006 § 6 chart 6-5 (2007), http://www.bls.gov/cps/labor2006/
home.htm#families.
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Middle-income families in particular depend on substantial
earnings by wives. 51
3. Skewed Toward Relatively Affluent One-
Breadwinner Marriage
The marital income-splitting tax benefit largely works to
lower the tax liability of more affluent households (except for
those at the highest income levels). Marriage itself is
concentrated at higher income levels, so that a marital tax break
is inherently regressive. In 2007, 78.9% of households with
income in the top fifth of income levels and 83.5% of
households in the top twentieth of income levels consisted of
married couples, compared to only 17.1% of households in the
bottom fifth of income levels and 49.3% of those in the middle
fifth.5 2
Furthermore, the benefits of the "marriage bonus" are
concentrated among relatively affluent married couples. In a
study of the pre-2001 marital tax system based on 1993 data, tax
scholar Dorothy Brown showed that married couples earning
more than $120,000 (in 1993 dollars) were most likely to benefit
from the "marriage bonus" because unequal-earning marriages
were concentrated at those upper income levels (as well as at
very low-income levels not subject to taxation).53 By contrast,
relatively equal-earning marriages, which do not benefit as
"' See, e.g., ECON. POLICY INST., INCREASED WORK BY WIVES CUSHIONS
FALL IN FAMILY INCOME, STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 1998/99 (1999) http://
www.epi.org/economic snapshots/cntry/
webfeatures snapshots archive_03101999.
52 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 2008 ANNUAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT tbl. HINC-05 (2008), available at http://
pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032008/hhinc/newO5000.htm.
53 Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class and Gender Essentialism in Tax
Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469, 1499-1501 tbl. 3.3
(1997).
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substantially from the income-splitting bonus, are concentrated
at middle income levels.54
Tax reforms implemented after 2001 have expanded the
marriage bonus so that it reaches downward on the income scale
to many more moderately earning families, but this expansion
still directs the most generous tax benefits to a relatively small
portion of marriages. Estimating the distributional impact of the
marriage reforms (through 2010), the Tax Policy Center
projected that nearly sixty-six percent of the gains from the
changes would go to tax units with income between $100,000
and $500,000 (most of that going to moderately affluent tax
units with income between $100,000 and $200,000), while only
14.4% of the gains would go to tax filers with income below
$75,000). 55
In the contemporary United States economy, relatively few
families can sustain moderately affluent income levels with only
one person's income. In the top two income quintiles, more than
three-quarters of families have two earners, 56 although a portion
of these dual-earning marriages consist of highly unequal
spousal earnings benefitting from marital income-splitting. 57 In
2006, the median income for married couples with employed
wives was $86,773, while the median income for married
couples with wives not in the paid labor force was $56,815 (and
the median income for married couples with wives as the sole
54 Id. at 1504 tbl. 3.5, 1505 tbl. 3.6 (showing that relative equal 60/40 and
50/50 divisions of marital income arc most common in white families caming
between $40,000 and $90,000 and most common in African American families
caming between $30,000 and $120,000).
55 TAX POLICY CTR., EXTEND MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF, PRE-EGGTRA
BASELINE WITH AMT FIX, DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL TAX CHANGES BY INCOME
CLASS, 2010, tbl. T07-0027, (Aug. 26, 2008,10:34 AM), http://
www.taxpolicyccntcr.org/numbcrs/Content/PDF/T07-0027.pdf.
56 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 52, at tbl. FINC-06 (showing that
77.3% of families with incomes in the 4th income quintilc, 81.1% of families in
the top income quintile, and seventy-eight percent of families with the top five
pcrccnt of income, had two or more camers).
57 See Brown, supra note 53, at 1500 tbl. 3.3 (showing distribution of
income between spouses at various income levels).
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earner was S47,846). 58 At 2008 tax rates, that median income
level for marriages with sole-breadwinning husbands would
produce a tax bonus of $3,275 compared to a single taxpayer
with identical earnings (assuming a simplified return). 59 That
bonus provides a substantial benefit for middle-income
taxpayers, but higher income married sole breadwinners can
receive a marital income-splitting benefit reaching nearly
$10,000 a year. The marital income-splitting benefit
concentrates benefits on relatively affluent taxpayers, however,
not the very richest: it plateaus and phases out at very high
income levels.
Table 1 below gives examples of how the income-splitting
bonus under 2008 rates is skewed toward relatively affluent
taxpayers with one-breadwinner marriages.
5 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES tbl. 678
(2007), available at www.ccnsus.gov/compcndia/statab/2009/tablcs/09s0678.xs.
11 See infraTabIc I.
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TABLE 1: Tax Benefit of One-Breadwinner Marriage by
Income0o
INCOME TAX on single TAX on one- Income-
filing one- earner married splitting bonus
earner filing jointly for married
one-earners
$400,000 $115,873 $106,414 $9459
$300,000 $82,182 $72,207 $9975
$200,000 $48,928 $39,732 $9196
$150,000 $33,472 $25,732 $7740
$100,000 $19,472 $13,213 $6259
$90,000 $16,672 $10,713 $5959
$75,000 $12,856 $7763 $5093
$56,815 $8310 $5035 $3275
$50,000 $6606 $4013 $2593
$45,000 $5356 $3263 $2093
$40,000 $4256 $2513 $1743
$30,000 $2756 $1210 $1546
$25,000 $2006 $710 $1296
4. Skewed to breadwinning Husbands
The income-splitting provision is gender neutral on its
face, in that it is available to relatively affluent breadwinners
married to non-earning or low-earning spouses regardless of the
gender of the breadwinner. Nonetheless, taken in social context,
it tends to target tax benefits to households with primary-
breadwinning husbands. In the vast majority of relatively
affluent heterosexual marriages with a breadwinner-homemaker
division of spousal labor, it is the husband who is the primary
breadwinner and the wife who is the non-earning or very low-
earning specialized homemaker. In 2001, wives were the
primary earner (the source of 60% or more of marital income) in
only 12% of marriages in the United States, and the average
60 This table assumes 2008 rates and a simplified return with standard
deductions and no dependents.
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percentage of marital income contributed by wives was 35.6%.61
As a result, even when wives are major family breadwinners,
they are less likely than husbands to have a spouse with earnings
sufficiently low to allow for substantial income-splitting
benefits.
The highest rates of primary breadwinning by wives likely
occur at income levels too low to benefit from the marital
income tax break. 62 Dorothy Brown found, for example, that less
than ten percent of African American wives earned eighty
percent or more of the marital income (based on 1993 data) at all
household income levels above $30,000 a year (in 1993
dollars). 63 Middle or upper income white wives in the paid labor
force were even less likely than husbands to be primary
breadwinners with marginally earning spouses. In Brown's
analysis, only five percent or less of white wives in households
with income over $30,000 earned more than eighty percent of
the household income in 1993. 64
Moreover, in one important respect, the tax system's
income-splitting bonus is not gender neutral. As many have
criticized, 65 breadwinners married to homemakers of the same
sex cannot take advantage of marital income splitting, since the
Defense of Marriage Act requires federal tax law to recognize
61 Sara B. Raley et al., How Dual are Dual-Income Couples: Documenting
Change from 1970 to 2001, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 11 (2006). In 2008, wives
were the sole earner in 6.9% of all marriages in the United States, while
husbands were the sole earner in 19.5% of marriages. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 2008 (2009),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.releasc/famee.htm.
62 See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA I 10
tbl. 1.33 (2003) (noting that wives of low-earning husbands contribute
proportionately more to family income than do wives of high-earning husbands).
63 Brown, supra note 53, at 1492 tbl. 3.1.
64 Id. at 1496 tbl. 3.2.
65 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal
Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REv. 465, 469-71 (2000).
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only "a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife.1
66
But the inequities of the income-splitting bonus go beyond
both this facial exclusion of primary breadwinners outside
heterosexual marriage and the de facto exclusion of most
primary breadwinning wives. The existence of such inequities
requires a closer examination of the context and impact of the
policy that favors relatively affluent breadwinner-homemaker
marriages.
5. Skewed to White Husbands
The marital income-splitting provision also works to target
tax benefits away from African American marriages and from
African American breadwinners. Although race neutral on its
face, in social context it produces a racially skewed impact, as
Dorothy Brown has analyzed extensively.67 That is because one-
earner marriages are much less common among relatively
affluent African Americans than white Americans, and because,
even within dual-earning marriages, African American husbands
and wives are much more likely than white spouses to earn
relatively equal incomes.68 Though this disparate racial impact
may not have clearly or explicitly motivated the design of the
income-splitting tax policy, this racial effect is unlikely to be a
matter of simple accident or unforeseeable consequence. This
tax scheme originated from a mid-twentieth century social
context in which the breadwinner-homemaker family was
typically associated with white racial identity and privilege. 69
- I U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
67 Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White,
65 U. CIN. L. REv. 787 (1997) [hereinafter Brown, Bonus/Penalty]; Brown,
supra note 5; Brown supra note 53.
68 Brown, Bonus/Penalty, supra note 67, at 1475 n.23-25; Brown, supra
note 5, at 287 tbl. 1.2, 1.3.
69 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE
L.J. 51, 53 (1997) (discussing the racial nature of the ideal of a domestic sphere
of family homemaking labor separate from the market).
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C. Not a Dependent Care Bonus
The target of the income-splitting tax bonus is therefore not
marriage, but more precisely the relatively affluent breadwinner-
homemaker marriage, commonly characterized by the ideal of a
(usually white) wife whose husband's economic success allows
her to concentrate on informal domestic family care rather than
formal market earnings. Tax theory has sometimes suggested
that the marital income-splitting benefit works (in effect if not
by intent) as support for the unpaid family care labor typically
done by homemaking wives in one-breadwinner marriages.70
But the income-splitting benefit is not closely tailored to support
the dependent care work typically identified as the specialty of
non-earning or low-earning homemaking wives.
The income-splitting bonus reduces the taxable income of
affluent breadwinners married to non-breadwinners (or low
earners) regardless of the presence or absence of dependents,
such as children or non-working persons with illness or
disability. It is possible that a substantial portion or even most of
the tax benefits of marital income-splitting go to married couples
without dependents: according to 2007 census data, at all income
quintiles except the lowest fifth, just over half of all families
(defined as two or more persons living together and formally
related by birth, marriage or adoption) have no dependent
children. 71
Even excluding married couples over age sixty-five who
benefit from income-splitting, more than forty percent of marital
families had no children under age eighteen in 2000.72
Furthermore, most marital families with dependents likely
70 See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and
Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2014-15 (1996) (asserting that
the feminist goal of supporting family caretakers could be a justification for the
marital income-splitting benefit single-eamer couples); Bittker, supra note II, at
1417 (stating that "once enacted, however, income splitting for married couples
came to be seen as a tax allowance for family responsibilities").
71 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 52.
72 JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK,
FAMILY & GENDER INEQUALITY 44 tbl.2.1 (2004) (based on 2000 U.S. Census
Bureau Current Population Survey data).
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receive little or no benefit from marital income-splitting because
most spouses who provide infonnal family dependent care are
also income earners who contribute to family breadwinning. In
2005, nearly seventy percent of married mothers of children
under age eighteen were in the paid labor force, as were nearly
sixty percent of married mothers of children under age six and
slightly more than half of the married mothers of children under
age one. 73 In 2000, wives with one or more children under age
eighteen worked an average of 38.8 hours per week in paid
labor.74
In short, the marital income-splitting tax rates are both
underinclusive and overinclusive as support for informal
dependent caretaking within marital families. But focusing on
homemaking labor does point toward a better way of
understanding the income-splitting tax bonus and its inequities.
D. Aid for Husband Care
1. Caretaking for Husbands in Breadwinner-
Homemaker Marriage
What social purpose is effectively served by a family tax
shelter limited to breadwinners who fit the classic paradigm of a
white affluent husband providing for a homemaking wife
without substantial market earnings? As the breadwinner-
homemaker division of marital labor has become less dominant
as a demographic fact and social norm, the income-splitting tax
benefit may seem to serve little rational social function. From
such a perspective, the early twenty-first century expansion of
this tax bonus for breadwinner-homemaker marriage appears
particularly puzzling, other than as a reminder of the difficulty of
updating tax systems designed for a previous social era.
13 Sharon R. Cohany & Emy Sok, Trends in Labor Force Participation of
Married Mothers of Infants, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 2007, at 9, 10-11 charts
I & 2, tbl. I; see also HEATHER BOUSHEY, CTR. ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH,
ARE WOMEN OPTING OUT: DEBUNKING THE MYTH (2005) (arguing that evidence
of a small recent decline in employment rates of married mothers suggests a
falling general employment rate rather than significant withdrawal from the labor
market by married mothers).
74 JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 72, at 44 tbl. 2.1.
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A missing piece that fits this puzzle can be found in close
examination of the marital division of domestic labor aided by
this policy. As discussed above, the tax bonus is not well
targeted to support unpaid family dependent caretaking labor.
However, it is closely tailored to support marriages in which
homemaking spouses engage in unpaid caretaking labor for a
primary breadwinner in lieu of substantial formal market
earnings.
Although contemporary portrayals of wives "opting out" of
paid labor typically focus on dependent care, especially for
young children, 75 "husband care" labor is also central to the
traditional legal and social identity of homemaking wives. The
hypothetical of Breadwinner Bob and Homemaker Hannah
suggests some of the ways in which non-earning homemaking
spouses (disproportionately wives) may specialize in informal
caretaking for spouses who are primary breadwinners
(disproportionately husbands). A 2005 study of time diaries
showed that married women without children spent six more
hours per week on housework than single women, and more than
twice as much time on housework as their husbands. 76 This
increased housework for wives compared to their husbands as
well as single women may reflect some combination of a shift in
caretaking labor from men to women upon marriage, a net
addition of caretaking work by wives upon marriage and a shift
from paid domestic labor to informal caretaking upon marriage.
This unpaid "husband care" work by homemaking wives is
not a problem simply of gender subordination or outdated
gender socialization. Indeed, "husband care" work may be
increasingly important to the economic and personal well-being
of many husbands and wives in contemporary society. Time for
leisure and personal caretaking is a significant issue for many
'5 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 25 (criticizing the popular media's
portrayals of women's reasons for leaving the workplace to focus on home
responsibilities).
76 RELEASE, UNIV. OF MICH. INST. FOR Soc. RESEARCH, EXACTLY HOW
MUCH HOUSEWORK DOES A HUSBAND CREATE? (2008), available at http://
www.ns.umich.edu/htdocs/releases/story.php?id=6452 (reporting findings of
study led by economist Frank Stafford, based on data from the federally-funded
Panel Study of Income Dynamics).
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United States breadwinners. Although average work hours in
formal paid employment have not significantly increased since
1970 in the United States, that measure masks an increased
bifurcation by economic class in time spent on paid
employment. 77 In 2000, 26.5% of employed men and 11.3% of
employed women worked more than fifty hours a week in paid
employment, compared to 21% of men and 5.2% of women in
1970.78 In certain groups, long work weeks are particularly
common: 38% of male college graduates and 19% of female
college graduates work more than fifty hours week, as do 37.2%
of men who work in professional, technical, or managerial
occupations. 79 On the other hand, more men also report working
less than thirty hours per week in 2000 than in 1970, with these
low-hour workers concentrated at lower educational levels and
in occupations other than professional, technical and managerial
categories. 80
Even without dependents, higher income married couples
are likely to face pressure to divide their labor into one primary
breadwinner and one specialized homemaker to manage work
and caretaking demands. Jerry Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson note
in their study of work and family time pressures, a fifty hour
work week means not only ten hours of formal work each day (if
spread over five weekdays) but also additional time for lunch
and commuting that typically can stretch those ten-hour days to
more than eleven hours. 8' Jacobs and Gerson found that about
half of workers with formal jobs requiring fifty hours per week
or more report that they regularly work on the weekends. 82
Fifteen percent of workers with fifty hours or more a week in
77 JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 72, at 32-39; see also Laura T. Kessler,
Getting Class, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 915, 930-31 (2008) (arguing for more attention
by legal scholars to sociological data on the family, using example of studies of
class differences in market work hours).
78 JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 72, at 34 tbl. 1.2.
7 9 
Id.
80 Id. at 34-35 tbl. 1.2.
81 ld. at 32.
82 ld. at 35.
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formal employment report that they usually work seven days per
week. 83 Jacobs and Gerson found that over one third of workers
"feel unable to get everything done at home because of their
job" due to time pressures. Further they found that even with
decreased housework and increases in purchased domestic
services, a substantial portion of workers still feel they have
insufficient time for tasks like paying bills and maintaining their
homes and cars. 84
Although this study noted that long work hours put
pressure on employed parents, they found that employed wives
married to employed husbands would prefer reduced hours in
formal employment regardless of whether the couple had
preschool age children. 85 In a study consisting of in-depth
interviews with a group of non-employed white married mothers
who quit highly successful careers to be full-time homemakers,
researchers concluded that "husbands had an arguably greater
effect on women's decisions to quit than the more immediately
pressing and oft-cited "family" demands of children." 86 This
was because wives (often implicitly) made a priority of
advancing their husbands' careers and so wanted to free their
husbands from home and parenting responsibilities. 87
Although women in upper income marriages have high
rates of formal labor market participation, 88 rising income for
very high-earning husbands can lead to decreased formal
employment by wives. 89 Examples of high-income one-
83 Id.
s4 JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 72, at 84.
85 Id. at 68 tbl.3.2, 72.
16 See STONE supra note 21, at 62.
87 Id.
8' WILLIAMS ETAL., supra note 25, at 25 (citing data showing that though
wives of mcn in the top five percent of income levels are employed at lower rates
than wives in the bottom ninety-five percent of earnings, more than half of these
wives were nonetheless employed).
89 Id. at 4-7.
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breadwinner families show how breadwinning husbands can
gain from increased informal services from wives who have
withdrawn from formal employment. In one marriage where the
wife left her job as a lawyer to become a full time homemaker,
both spouses noted benefits to the high-earning husband as well
as to the children. For example, the wife had increased time to
plan vacations and decorate their home.90  Similarly, in
discussing his wife's change from an employed journalist to a
full-time homemaker, another working husband expressed his
pleasure that his wife could now "take care of 'the trivial stuff'
such as car maintenance and grocery-shopping" and that her
domestic work gives him more free time.91 An executive coach
reports specifically that high-income men are often surprised by
how much they gain when their wives withdraw from formal
employment: "They get their wives back .... Now the focus can
be on his career, his needs."'92 Another high-income executive
and husband with a non-employed wife explained his gain from
having his wife take over household chores as a full time
homemaker: "I was completely spoiled by my mom growing up.
Now I've gotten back to that point.' '93 These gains to husbands
may also accrue in part to homemaking wives through
opportunities to share the husbands' enhanced earnings.
Even when couples want to resist such a traditionally
gendered division of domestic labor, they may forgo that choice
in order to reap the economic benefits of concentrating marital
investments in one career. Couples may reap joint economic
gains from freeing one breadwinner to pursue career
opportunities like travel or job relocation without having to
accommodate the other spouse's competing employment
I Nancy Ann Jeffrey, The New-Economy Family, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8,
2000, at W I.
91 Id. (quoting John McCaskill, a design engineer whose wife had been
out of the labor market for a year).
92 Id. (quoting Michelle Kremen Bolton, of ExecutivEdge in Silicon
Valley).
93 Id. (quoting software executive Kevin Fitzgerald).
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responsibilities. 94  Furthermore, for higher income jobs,
employers' expectations for unpaid support from wives may
penalize or pressure breadwinners who lack such support.
Journalist Ann Crittenden quotes an interview with one
corporate consultant who explained, "[t]he presence of a wife at
home to care for family and personal matters is almost as much a
requirement in business today as it was a generation ago."95 Law
professor Mary Anne Case, describing her experience as the only
one of five tenure-track junior faculty members at a prominent
law school without a stay-at-home wife, notes that the law
school planned to provide lunch only for faculty with
homemaking wives whose home-cooked meals would otherwise
deter their spouses from staying at work to dine with
colleagues.
96
Other stories show how even without children or other
dependents and even at middle or upper middle incomes, the
demands of domestic care for breadwinning husbands can
contribute to a wife's decision to substitute full-time informal
homemaking for formal employment. In a journalist's report on
childless non-earning wives, one former high school teacher
explained that as a married homemaker she spent substantial
weekly time on laundry, grocery shopping, housecleaning and
running errands, although she also had significant time for her
own leisure activities. 97 Another wife without children explained
that a period of full-time homemaking allowed her to "clip
coupons, do the chores, and make nice dinners" with reduced
94See Jonathan Kaufman, Regaining a Balance: Back to the 50s, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 31, 1997, at 6 (explaining how executive Nicola Ganio's career
"thrived" once his wife quit her paid employment).
95 ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 18 (2001) (quoting a
1994 conversation with consultant Charles Rodgers).
96 Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions
About Where, Why and How the Burden of Care for Children Should be Shifted,
76 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1753, 1763-64 n.30 (2001).
17 Sarah Jio, No Kids, No Jobs for Growing Number of Wives, CNN (Aug.
5, 2008, 3:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/wayoflife/08/05/
Iw.nokids.nojob.wives/ index.html?iref-allsearch.
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stress and tension. 98 Her husband noted that he was happiest
when his wife was not employed because she had time for more
cleaning, gardening, bargain shopping, as well as maintaining
the couples' energy and emotional health. Another wife
commented that going from a dual-earning household to a
single-earning household with her husband as sole breadwinner
means that their weekends can be spent running, watching
movies, relaxing and being together as a couple, rather than
doing errands, repairs, and other household chores. 99
In addition to performing typical homemaking services for
their employed husbands, wives without substantial outside
employment may informally contribute unpaid time and skill to
their husbands' formal market work. Indeed, some firms appear
to evaluate the potential informal contribution of executives'
wives as a significant part of the executive hiring process even
though such considerations can violate antidiscrimination
laws.' 00 Tax scholar Lisa Philipps analyzed data suggesting
employees in a wide range of occupations and income levels
may use their unpaid wives or other family members as informal
workers or partners in their jobs. '0 For example, wives who are
not formally employed by their husbands' firms may host
business events, engage in networking and increase business
contacts by hosting social activities and participating in public
relations activities. 102 Wives of professionals who bring work
home may similarly help with tasks like grading papers,
maintaining the home office, editing manuscripts or assisting
with word processing. 10 3 Husbands who run a business may
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Leslie Kaufman, The Significant Other, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at
ST I.
"I Lisa Philipps, Helping Out in the Family Firm: The Legal Treatment of
Unpaid Market Labor, 23 Wis. J.L., GENDER & Soc'Y 65,85-98 (2008).
102 Id. at 67-75.
013 See id. at 94 (noting literature on informal work by wives of
academics, clergy, self-employed professionals and others whose jobs include
work at home and tasks that seem like "women's work").
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depend on their unpaid wives to help with tasks such as
bookkeeping, decision-making, managing employees,
marketing, or answering the phone. 104 Although the traditional
small farm or small "mom and pop" business run by informal
family labor is no longer the norm in the United States, Philipps
argues that contemporary labor market conditions promoting
self-employment and home-based work may also increase
dependence on informal contributions by workers' family
members. 105
Besides taking over domestic chores, increasing leisure and
informally contributing to spouses' formal market work,
homemakers may use their own time to invest in their spouses'
human capital-that is, their long term physical and mental well-
being-in ways that increase a specialized breadwinner's future
earnings potential. Some data shows that husbands in particular
reap non-economic benefits from marriage such as increases in
healthy behaviors. 10 6  A journalist's comparison of men
recovering from heart attacks described how an unemployed
wife was an important factor in one affluent man's speedy return
to good health.' 1 7 His wife researched the best treatments,
scheduled and managed medical appointments, handled
communications with doctors, filled his prescriptions, monitored
his symptoms, changed his diet and-took charge of medical bills
and insurance payments. 108
In sum, a defining characteristic of the specialized
breadwinner-homemaker marriage, especially those that are
relatively affluent, is that this specialization facilitates informal
marital caretaking work for primary breadwinners, especially
104 Id. at 78, 90-91.
1'5 Id.at 88-90.
106 See LINDA WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:
WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF
FINANCIALLY 164 (2000) (attributing particular benefits to husbands to unhealthy
behavior by single men but not single women).
107 Janny Scott, Life at the Top in America Isnt Just Better, Its Longer,
N.Y.TIMES, May 16, 2005, atAl (discussing the experience of Jean G. Miele).
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those in professional jobs that benefit from long work hours and
substantial social capital or home support. It is true that the tax
bonus from marital income splitting directs benefits to relatively
affluent breadwinner-homemaker marriages simply because
taxable marital earnings are unequally divided, and not because
of any measurement or requirement of what the homemaking
spouse actually does. Nonetheless, this structure of marital labor
is widely perceived and practiced as a means of enhancing
informal spousal caretaking services for primary breadwinners,
typically husbands. For that reason, it makes sense to examine
the breadwinner-homemaker tax bonus as a system that in effect,
if not by intent, operates as tax support for caretaking services
for breadwinners who are particularly likely to receive many of
those services outside of the formal labor market from a non-
breadwinning wife.
2. Tax Bonus in Context of Wage Premium for
Husband Care
The theory that the tax bonus works as implicit support for
"husband care" by unpaid homemaking wives of affluent
breadwinners fits into the pattern of socioeconomic benefits for
the status of paradigmatic husbands. Evidence of a wage bonus
for husbands supports the theory that primary breadwinner
husbands-particularly those who. are white and affluent-
typically enhance their real or perceived marketable labor or
human capital through their wives' caretaking. A leading
longitudinal study that followed young white American men
aged fourteen to twenty-four from 1966 to1984 found that
married white men earned about eleven percent more than never-
married men (controlling for labor market experience, completed
schooling, union status, year of birth, geography, presence of
dependents and occupation). 10 9 Some studies suggest an even
greater "white husband premium," in the range of twenty to
109 Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make
Men More Productive, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 282, 287, 291 (1991).
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thirty-two percent (based on 1977 data)" ° or, in a recent study
comparing identical twins, twenty-six percent. "
At least some evidence supports the theory that this
"husband premium" is not simply a relic of outdated gender
roles or bygone stereotypes by old-fashioned employers, but that
it persists in the early twenty-first century labor market.1 2 A
study of 2004 data on American men aged twenty-five to forty-
nine found that without controlling for other differences, married
men have a thirty-four percent earning advantage over never-
married men and a twenty-one to twenty-four percent advantage
over separated and divorced men respectively. 113 Some evidence
suggests that this "husband premium" is substantially higher for
husbands whose wives do not work in the formal labor
market, 114 and for wage-working wives, the "husband premium"
seems to decline as wives' market work hours increase.1 15
Although most studies have focused on white men, some
evidence has showed a wage bonus, though lesser, for married
black men." 6 By contrast, marriage is likely to bring a wage
110 Robin Bartlett & Charles Callahan, Wage Determination and Marital
Status: Another Look, 23 INDUS. REL. 90, 90-96 (1984).
I" Kate Antonovics, & Robert Town, Are All the Good Men Married?
Uncovering the Sources of the Marital Wage Premium, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 317,
317-21 (2004).
112 Avner Ahituv & Robert I. Lerman, How do Marital Status, Wage Rates
& Work Commitment Interact?, in AMERICAN UNIV. INST. STUDY LABOR (IZA
Discussion Paper No. 1688, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-773950
(discussing evidence that marital wage advantages have not withered away,
countering the conclusions of some research).
'' Id. at 2.
14 Hyunbae Chun & Injac Lee, Why Do Married Men Earn More:
Productivity or Marriage Selection?, 39 ECON. INQUIRY 307 (2001).
115 Kermit Daniel, The Marriage Premium, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 121 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn lerulli eds., 1995).
116 See Ahituv & Lerman, supra note 112, at 7, 21 (finding that married
and remarried black men's wages were "slightly higher" than comparable never-
married black men's wages but slightly lower than divorced black men's wages);
Daniel, supra note 115, at 121 (noting a larger marital wage premium for white
men than for black men).
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penalty for breadwinning white women and a much smaller
wage bonus for black women.11 7 Because this wage effect is
targeted at married men, the phrase "husband premium" seems a
more appropriate description than the more common term
"marriage premium."
Researchers have debated the extent to which this
"husband premium" results from wives' informal domestic
contributions to their husbands' human capital rather than from
wives' selection of men with pre-existing intangible advantages
in human capital. 118 Nonetheless, husbands' gains from wives'
domestic service plausibly account for at least some of
husbands' wage advantage. One analysis of the data, for
example, found that men increase their formal work hours
immediately after marriage, and that even though this work-hour
advantage lessens over the long run (compared to single men),
the additional early work hours represent an important
investment in human capital for married male breadwinners that
pays off over the long run with substantially higher work
income.' 19 This analysis supports the idea that wives' domestic
services typically give husbands the physical, mental and social
resources to work more hours more productively (or at least to
appear to work more productively), so that husbands invest
117 Daniel, supra note 115, at 123 (summarizing evidence that marriage
has a negative relationship with wages for white women and attributing this
marital wage penalty to the effect of children on white women's wages); Anne E.
Lincoln, Gender, Productivity, and the Marital Wage Premium, 70 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 806 (2008).
118 See, e.g., Daniel, supra note 115, at 114 (discussing alternatives to the
theory that marriage raises wages because it increases husbands' productivity).
19 Ahituv & Lerman, supra note 112, at 25-28.
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more in their careers early on than otherwise comparable single
breadwinning men and married breadwinning women. 120
Returning to our hypothetical, Breadwinner Bob will not
only get a reduced tax rate after marrying Homemaker Hannah,
but he can also expect a wage increase compared to a single
earner with similar experience and skills. If so, he might view
the marital income-splitting tax benefit as a special tax
exemption for the expected marital income gain from his
employer, or as a special tax exemption for the costs of
enhancing his human capital via the services of his homemaking
wife. Single Sophia, on the other hand, may be even more
suspicious of the equities of a tax system that seems to echo and
exacerbate the market's use of husband status as a proxy for
merit (even ihough the tax system's rewards are not explicitly
gender-linked). To further dig into the question of the equity of
this tax benefit for breadwinner-homemaker marriage, this
Article turns to the ideas and law underlying the structure of the
breadwinner-homemaker division of labor traditionally
identified with the status of husband.
3. Tax Bonus in Context of Family Law Protection
for Husband Care
The tax system's marital income-splitting grows out of a
legal regime in which the legal status of husband has
traditionally involved a nonreciprocal entitlement to a wife's
unpaid caretaking services. Martha Fineman has analyzed and
criticized how law traditionally has made the marital relationship
the foundation of the legal family rather than the relationship
120 Although some interesting research has found no correlation between
male time on housework and increased wages, which suggests that married
men's increased wages may not be due to increased productivity from
specialization in paid labor, wives' domestic services might nonetheless produce
increased wages for husbands primarily due to changes in the nature and total
quantity of domestic services for the husband. See Joni Hersch & Leslie S.
Stratton, Household Specialization and the Male Marriage Wage Premium, 54
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78, 78-94 (2000) (finding little difference between
married and unmarried men in total time spent on housework, but significant
differences in the nature of housework done by married versus unmarried men).
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between dependent child and parent. '21 Similarly the tax code's
income-splitting provision focuses family tax support centrally
on the marital relationship, rather than on dependency
relationships. 122 Legal regulation of marriage, whether in family
law or tax law, is not simply about promoting marriage per se,
but about distributing resources within the marital family and
among families. Examination of the legal construction of the
marital breadwinner-homemaker relationship demonstrates how
the tax bonus as a device that not only promotes marriage, but
also distributes resources within the family and among families.
In the common law tradition of "coverture," wives' legal
personhood, including rights to contract and own property, were
subsumed under their husbands' authority.123 The husband was
entitled to his wife's earnings and to other economic gain from
her labor, and he had the right to compel her service and
obedience. 124 Legal historian Hendrik Hartog posits that the
traditional legal duty of a husband to support his wife should not
be understood as an exchange that recognizes the wife's right to
reciprocal benefit for her unpaid service, but rather that it serves
as a means to identify and legitimate the status of the husband. 125
Indeed, in the broader philosophical tradition that shaped
American law, a man's political, economic and social status was
intimately linked to his identity as a husband. 126 Classical
political theory linked a man's status as a citizen with political
and legal rights to a man's status as a household master
121 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 2-5 (1995).
122 See infra Part II.C (comparing the marital income-splitting bencfit to
income-splitting and other tax supports for heads of households).
123 See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 136-
37 (2000) (describing coverture in 19th century American law).
124 Id. at 156, 150 n.36.
125 Id. at 165-66; see also id. at 156-59 (explaining that despite rhetoric of
the husbands' duty to support, husbands generally had unilateral private authority
within marriage to determine wives' needs and benefits).
126 Id. at 101.
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commanding the service of a wife and servants. 127 The right to
marry was crucial to differentiating citizens from slaves in
antebellum America not only because marriage signified the
freedom to enter into contracts but also because marriage
established men's authority to be served by others. 128 When
slavery was abolished, American law continued and even
strengthened the idea that marriage is not only a private
individual contractual right but also a relationship within which
unequal gender status-namely a man's right to "his wife"--was
important to public policy and civic virtue. 129 Historian Amy
Dru Stanley analyzes how the dominant nineteenth century
vision of abolition aimed to give the African American man
freed from slavery "the birthright of all free men: Title not only
to himself but to his wife-to her person, labor, and
sexuality.' 130
Although nineteenth century statutory reforms have
modified the traditional doctrine of coverture, Reva Siegel
argues that updated marriage laws nonetheless have preserved
and modernized a husband's right to his wife's uncompensated
domestic caretaking services as the "essence" of marital
status.13I Despite rejecting the common law rule that a husband
127 Id.; see also MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER:
PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3-8 (2005)
(discussing the roots of American ideas of government in the classic idea of the
head of household's unequal authority to govern his wife, children, servants,
animals, and inanimate property within the household).
128 AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 24-25, 27,
29 (1998).
'29 See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE
NATION 94-95, 101 (2000) (discussing how Congress affirmed marital hierarchy
after the Civil War on the theory that marriage was a public institution, not solely
a private contract); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating Wives'Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2182 n.
210 (1994) (concluding that "without exceptions" judges denied intraspousal
contract claims regarding wives' domestic labor in cases under reformed late
19th century marriage statutes).
130 STANLEY, supra note 128, at 29.
131 Siegel, supra note 129, at 2209-10.
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is entitled to all the fruits of his wife's labor, the reformed laws
have reinforced coverture's presumption that marriage is a status
that entitles a husband to the fruit of his wife's domestic labor.1 32
The contemporary rule still remains, although in at least
nominally gender-neutral form, that homemaking spouses owe
domestic labor to their spouses as a matter of uncompensated
marital duty, so that contracts to protect a homemaker's rights to
property or income in exchange for those domestic services are
unenforceable. 133  In contrast, contracts to protect a
breadwinner's property or income from a homemaker's claims
in divorce or death are now enforceable in most states. 134 As one
court explained in refusing to honor a marital agreement by a
husband to transfer property to his wife after his death in
exchange for her performance of round the clock nursing care,
domestic caretaking traditionally done by a wife for a husband
must be done for free as a matter of marital duty, regardless of
any agreement the spouses actually entered into. 35
This marital duty to provide uncompensated family
caretaking services specifically focused, historically, on wives'
services to breadwinning husbands, not just on wives' caretaking
for dependents. For example, Wisconsin enacted legislation
giving married women the right to earn income in 1872, but this
reform denied wives the right to financial gain "accruing from
labor performed for her husband or in his employ or payable by
132 Id. at 2203-04 (discussing courts' reasoning for refusing to enforce
wives' contracts with husbands for compensation for domestic labor).
133 Id. at 2131 (stating that under the reformed marriage laws, courts
universally refused to enforce intraspousal contracts for compensation for
domestic labor); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and
the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 31-33 (1996).
134 Silbaugh, supra note 133, at 31-32 (explaining that almost all states
will enforce premarital agreements limiting a homemaking spouse's rights to
property and "the strong trend" among states is to enforce agreements to protect
a breadwinning spouse's income from support obligations or alimony for a
homemaker after divorce).
135 Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1993) (criticized in
Silbaugh, supra note 133, at 32-33).
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him. s136 Similarly, Indiana's 1879 marriage reforms granted
wives rights to gain from "trade, businesses, services, or labor,
other than labor for her husband or family. '137 The modem era's
ideology of separate domestic spheres has emphasized the
importance of wives' caretaking services to breadwinning
(white, affluent) husbands, whose market work would be
enhanced by their wives' creation of a spiritual haven at home. 138
The modernized "loss of consortium" action in tort specifically
recognized the value of wives personal services to husbands,
particularly emotional and sexual support. 139 Prior to late
twentieth century civil rights protections, women were
commonly deemed unfit for formal market work based on their
particular status as wives of (white affluent) breadwinners rather
than as mothers or other dependent caretakers. 140
In sum, legal protection of the breadwinner-homemaker
marital division of labor is not an isolated quirk of tax law's
inability to adapt to demographic change, nor is it simply a
simple reflection of consensus social practices. Instead, legal
regulation has shaped the contested internal meaning and rights
of the breadwinner-homemaker marital form by protecting and
promoting spouses' unpaid "husband care" for economically
successful married breadwinners. Regardless of the conscious
intentions of the proponents of this marital tax scheme, the effect
is to continue to target special benefits toward primary
breadwinners who fit the traditional paradigm of husband. The
policy question is why this special protection for paradigmatic
"husband care" should continue, even if in gender neutral form.
To answer that question, this Article turns to a scrutiny of the
reasons more overtly offered as justifications for this tax bonus.
136 Rcva B. Siegel, Home as Work, The First Women ' Rights Claims
Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-80, 103 YALE L. J. 1073, 1180
(citing Act of Mar. 25, 1872, ch. 155, § 2, 1872 Wis. LAWS 218).
131 Id. at 1181 (citing Act of Mar. 25, 1879, ch. 67, § 2, 1879 IND. ACTS
160).
138 See Siegel, supra note 136, at 1133 (giving example of testimony by a
women's right advocate in favor of joint property rights for wives).
139 Silbaugh, supra note 133, at 42-43.
'40 MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 33.
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VII. Rationales For Marital Income Splitting
How, then, does tax policy defend Breadwinner Bob's tax
break for his marriage to a low-earner or non-earner? Or,
paraphrasing tax scholar Amy Christian, why does the
government essentially pay a relatively affluent man to marry, or
to stay married to, a woman with substantially lower or no
income?141
Some defend this tax preference for married primary
breadwinners by explicitly affirming the traditional ideology of
family status. 142 Circular logic can make special government
assistance seem vital to maintaining the supposed independence
that helps make these breadwinners appear uniquely and
naturally morally superior.
More central to tax scholarship and policymaking,
however, are attempts to rationalize the tax bonus for traditional
affluent husbands as consistent with purportedly non-ideological
principles of tax equity. In the conventional wisdom, this tax
support is not a special privilege but simply a reasonable
interpretation of the normal, neutral goal of taxing similar
incomes similarly (horizontal equity) and different incomes
differently (vertical equity), with income defined (in the
foundational Haig-Simons principle) as consumption plus
savings. 143 But a closer analysis of these seemingly neutral tax
equity principles shows the rationales for income-splitting rest
on ideological underpinnings similar to the overtly conservative
rationales for privileging breadwinner-homemaker marriage.
141 Amy Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and
Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 275 (1997).
142 See INST. FOR AMERICAN VALUES, A CALL FOR FAMILY-SUPPORTIVE
TAX REFORM 7 (1999) (advocating full marital income-splitting as a means of
supporting married men's superior productivity); see also ALLAN CARLSON,
CONJUGAL AMERICA 100-08 (2007) (arguing for marital income-splitting as a
way to promote the brcadwinncr-homemaker marriage as the ideal family).
'43 See Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L.
REV: 807, 821-22 n.29 (2005) (stating that "traditional tax theory begins, and
sometimes ends, with the Haig-Simons definition of income," and citing classic
treatises).
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A. Equity Between Married and Single Breadwinners?
1. One Income, Two Consumers?
A common view is that a primary breadwinner married to a
non-breadwinning homemaker deserves a tax reduction
compared to the single breadwinner with the same income
because the married primary breadwinner's income supports two
people while the single breadwinner's income supports only one.
More technically, tax equity theory has justified the income-
splitting bonus by explaining that breadwinner-homemaker
marriages involve "shared consumption."' 44 For example, in
their classic analysis of family taxation, Michael McIntyre and
Oliver Oldman explain that the income-splitting bonus reflects
the fact that married primary breadwinners divert some of the
benefit of their income to homemaking spouses so that those
married primary breadwinners consume or accumulate less than
single breadwinners with comparable incomes. 145 For example,
Single Sophia should owe more taxes than Breadwinner Bob, in
this view, because she spends the entire $100,000 on goods and
services for herself while Bob shares (or at least should share)
the same income with his homemaking spouse.
One obvious problem with this "shared consumption"
argument is that the income-splitting tax benefit depends on the
formal status of federally recognized marriage to a non-earner or
low-earner, rather than to actual sharing of the breadwinner's
income. Many breadwinners filing as single taxpayers in fact
share their income in household partnerships not formally
recognized by American tax law. They are therefore excluded
from marital income-splitting tax benefits. 146 Furthermore, a
breadwinner in a federally recognized marriage may not actually
or fully share income with a non-earning or low-earning spouse
144 See Motro, supra note 7, at 1523 (explaining and critiquing shared
consumption as one of several justifications for marital income splitting).
14" Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1596
(1977).
'4 Motro, supra note 7, at 1543-49 (advocating changing the income
splitting tax benefit so that it is tied to functional income-sharing rather than
formal marriage).
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and may even live in an entirely separate household as a number
of tax scholars have discussed. 147
A more fundamental problem with the comparison has
received less close attention, however. Contrary to the standard
analysis, it is not necessarily or typically true that the earnings of
a single breadwinner not in an income-sharing household goes
"only to support one person." The "shared. consumption"
rationale for marital income-splitting implicitly relies on the
problematic assumption that a homemaking spouse is an
economic dependent, such as a child or other non-working
person who consumes, but does not produce, family income.
When instead recognizing that the primary breadwinning spouse
typically shares income with a specialized homemaker as part of
an exchange of domestic services for income, the single
breadwinner no longer appears so different.
A single affluent breadwinner in a one-person household
similarly can be expected to "share" income with others. Just as
Breadwinner Bob is likely to provide monetary support for his
homemaking wife's consumption, Single Sophia also is likely to
support the cumulative equivalent of an additional worker's
consumption of basic living expenses. A substantial portion of
Single Sophia's $100,000 income goes to pay those who help
provide her with domestic services-perhaps a house cleaner,
laundry workers, condominium building maintenance staff, and
restaurant workers. Like Breadwinner Bob's homemaking wife,
these service workers in turn use their share of Single Sophia's
income to purchase food, clothing, housing and other items for
themselves.
Unlike Breadwinner Bob, however, to the extent Single
Sophia purchases her various domestic services as market
commodities, the income she distributes to these workers by
147 For discussions of the empirical evidence of marital income pooling,
see id. at 1523-25 (noting that the empirical evidence is not only scarce and
unreliable, but also subject to varying interpretations); Marjoric E. Komhauscr,
Love, Money and the IRS: Fanily, Income Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax
Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 84-86 (1993) (arguing that finding that a
significant portion of married couples and cohabiting couples in two surveys did
not deposit earned income solely in joint accounts); Zelenak, supra note 4,at
348-54 (concluding "there has been remarkably little empirical research into the
income-sharing patterns of married couples").
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buying their services will come out of her after-tax dollars and
also will be taxable as income to the workers and may perhaps
even be subject to sales tax. In typical tax theory, Single
Sophia's allocation of some of her income to domestic service
providers would be a personal consumption choice that counts
toward taxable income, with greater consumption of domestic
services generally reflecting a greater ability to pay taxes. After
all, she could choose to do without these services, accepting a
lower quality of domestic life, or she could do the work herself
and sacrifice some combination of leisure, sleep and time
devoted to her profession. Perhaps she could also gamer unpaid
services from family or friends.
Of course Breadwinner Bob similarly makes a choice to
"spend" his income on a homemaking spouse, so the question
remains why his consumption choice gets special tax treatment.
One response might be that tax policy favors the choice of
"marriage" as more socially beneficial compared to consumption
of commodified services or goods. But, as discussed in Part
II(B), the income-splitting marital tax scheme does not favor the
choice of marriage, but rather the choice of a particular division
of income within relatively affluent breadwinner-homemaker
marriages.
This transfer of income to specialized homemaking
spouses may seem to be a moral or legal responsibility of the
breadwinning spouse rather than a contingent consumption
choice. But the decision of a married breadwinner to transfer
income to his or her homemaking spouse is not necessarily any
more morally selfless, legally necessary, or socially beneficial
than an unmarried breadwinner's choice to spend money on
domestic caretaking services or to enhance the well-being of
another non-earner or low-earner. Breadwinner Bob could
choose to marry a homemaking spouse willing to forgo
substantial personal consumption and live the kind of self-
sacrificing lifestyle that some might deem appropriate for
persons without substantial formal market labor-or that might
allow Breadwinner Bob to reserve a greater share of his income
for charity or for spending that generates further tax revenue to
support public consumption (by generating income to service
providers). Or, just as Single Sophia might decide not to
exchange her income for domestic services, Breadwinner Bob
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could choose to do the domestic chores himself or to forgo
domestic comforts in order to free up his homemaking spouse's
time and energy for pursuing market earnings that would accrue
directly and legally to her individually and that could potentially
bring greater benefits to society overall than her informal
domestic services to Breadwinning Bob.
As for legal obligations, in common law states, married
breadwinners retain sole title to their wages along with the right
to exclude spouses from that income during the marriage-
subject only to a rarely and loosely enforced requirement that
breadwinners ensure spouses have access to bare necessities.1 48
Even in community property states, breadwinning spouses are
free to contractually opt out of their default obligation to share
wage income during a marriage. 149 Indeed, family law doctrine
continues to assume that a homemaking spouse in an ongoing
marriage not only lacks a presumptive marital right to any
particular share of a breadwinning spouse's income in exchange
for homemaking, but also that a homemaker has no enforceable
right even to privately bargain with a spouse for any income or
assets in exchange for domestic services.150
1 See Motro, supra note 7, at 1519-21 (summarizing legal rules
governing married wagc earners' income); HARTOG, supra note 123, at 157
(explaining that in nineteenth century family law, husbands' duty to support a
homemaking wife was enforced mainly during separation and that for married
couples living together "courts never substituted their judgment as to the needs
of the wife for that of her husband"); id. at 306 (explaining that through the
twentieth century, wives' duty to be supported was limited by the husbands' right
to decide how marital resources would be spent); Silbaugh, supra note 133, at 34
(explaining that a homemaking spouse can only seek enforcement of a support
obligation against a spouse at divorce, and even then this obligation is typically
minimal and temporary).
149 See Motro, supra note 7, at 1521 (explaining that in both community
property and common law states, statutes and courts typically affirm pre- and
post-marital agreements so that any default rules of marital income-sharing are
effectively optional); Silbaugh, supra note 133, at 32-34 (explaining that while
family law has modernized the brcadwinning spouse's support obligation so that
it is essentially a matter of contractual choice, it has not similarly treated
caretaking work typically done by wives).
150 See Siegel supra note 129; Silbaugh, supra note 133, at 31-33
(discussing Borelli v. Brusseau).
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After divorce, family law can require a breadwinner to
share some property and income with a homemaking spouse, but
generally these divorce awards to homemaking wives are treated
as charity rather than as homemaker's rights to a breadwinner's
resources. Though divorce statutes typically direct courts to
consider homemakers' contributions to marital resources as one
factor in dividing assets, courts tend to ignore this factor or to
put a low value on domestic services so that primary
breadwinners with significant assets usually are not required to
split them equally. 15' Furthermore, non-earning or low-earning
homemakers rarely receive alimony in contemporary divorce
proceedings, and even if they do it tends to be construed as
temporary charity based on need, or perhaps on moral worth,
rather than on a right to compensation for homemaking. 152
Similarly, after death, statutory provisions in common law states
may give surviving spouses rights to one-third of any estate in
probate, but in practice homemaking spouses often are not well
protected from disinheritance by this rule, which at any rate is
not based on a theory of equal rights to the breadwinner's
gains. 153
These legal rules exacerbate the practical advantages of
affluent breadwinners in bargaining for marital resources with
homemaking spouses. In a low-income marriage, most of a
breadwinner's earnings will probably go to basic consumption
and necessities readily shared by the homemaking spouse, such
as housing, food, and furniture.. 154 In contrast, a relatively
... JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 120-21 (2000).
152 Id. at 121-22 (noting that only about eight percent of wives receive
alimony awards at divorce, and that the awards that are granted are usually
temporary and low). CRITTENDEN, supra note 95, at 149-61 (asking."who owns
the family wage?" after divorce and criticizing the current legal assumption that
the breadwinner does).
153 See Colby T. Roe, Arkansas Marriage: A Partnership Between a
Husband and a Wife, or a Safety Net for Support, 61 ARK. L. REV. 735, 744-45,
758-759 (2009) (explaining that spouses are more likely to be protected under
recent reforms in some states).
154 Zelenak, supra note 4, at 352 (using data on household expenditures
and income to conclude that pooling income is inevitable at the lowest income
quintile).
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affluent married breadwinner is likely to have significant
opportunity to avoid sharing earnings with a homemaking
spouse. 55 For example, Breadwinner Bob might divert much of
his wage income to his exclusive consumption of luxury items,
or to retirement funds or other assets that he controls or hides
from his wife. Or, he might choose to pay down his credit card
debt from his personal consumption prior to marriage. In
contrast, the transitory and non-commodified nature of spousal
domestic services means that a homemaking spouse will have
less power to hoard, hide or divert those services to their own
exclusive use in the present or future, with the result that the
homemaker will have less practical power to bargain for more
income-sharing within the marriage or to protect her
contributions against the risk of divorce. 156 Although a
dissatisfied homemaker married to a non-sharing breadwinner
may be free to return to work' 57 to procure her own income,
after substantial periods of withdrawal from the formal
workforce a homemaker's earning potential may be sharply
constrained.158 Furthermore, financial resources can be easier to
hide or more costly to fully analyze than homemaking services,
putting the homemaking spouse at a negotiating disadvantage.159
155 See Silbaugh, supra note 133, at 34 (explaining that the private power
to enforce marital breadwinning-homemaking agreements is asymmetrical since
income is easier to withhold than household services).
156 See supra notes 151-53 (discussing the limited rights to property and
alimony for homemakers in divorce).
157 However, breadwinners sometimes enforce homemaking with violence
directed at impeding women's return to formal market work. See Lisa D. Brush,
Battering, Traumatic Stress, and Welfare-to-Work Transition, 6 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN, 1039-1065, 1044 (2000) (discussing a study showing that
nearly one-half of women seeking to transition from welfare to work were
impeded by intimate violence).
158 WILLIAMS ETAL., supra note 25, at 15-16 (reporting on the difficulty
and long term wage penalties homemaking women face in procuring full-time
mainstream employment after withdrawing from formal employment, even when
they have high educational qualifications).
119 One study of marriage and finance found that husbands often give
much higher estimates of their family's financial resources than their wives, with
half of all married couples differing as much as thirty-five percent in their
perceptions of family finances. I.L. Zagorsky, Husbands 'and Wives' View of the
Family Finances, 32 J. SOCIO-ECON. 127 (2003).
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Of course, in practice many primary breadwinning spouses
do pool their income to allow shared consumption by a
homemaking spouse, whether out of loving altruism, self-
interest in inducing high quality homemaking and personal
loyalty, or deference to social norms. But Single Sophia could
similarly choose to be generous in sharing wage income with
domestic service providers, whether out of altruism or self-
interest in inducing quality service and personal connections.
She might, for example, generously pay her house cleaners or
restaurant servers to help them afford a middle-class lifestyle.
Yet this income sharing would be treated for tax purposes as
consumption by Single Sophia, counted toward her ability to pay
taxes. Regardless of how much either single or married primary
breadwinners give up or pay, formally or informally, in exchange
for their consumption of domestic services, the question remains
why the tax code should count only the married primary
breadwinners' "sharing" as decreasing consumption rather than
as a consumption gain.
One possible explanation could be that the "shared
consumption" rationale treats the homemaker's income as a
burden rather than a gain because it recognizes that in affluent
marriages homemaking spouses are less likely to provide basic
domestic services in return for income-sharing. For example,
Breadwinner Bob and Homemaker Hannah might pay others for
at least some housecleaning, lawn mowing, dry cleaning, home
repairs, and restaurant meals. Given that both households are
likely to use some paid domestic service, does it then make
sense to give greater tax support for Bob's breadwinning than for
Sophia's, since Bob will share his income with a spouse plus an
array of service workers-maybe the equivalent of supporting
two and a half or even three persons?
But married breadwinners can also reap substantial gains
from the more "spiritual" rather than "menial" labor, 160 or even
"leisure," likely provided by spouses of affluent primary
breadwinners. Just as Single Sophia's indirect or intangible gains
'60 See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997) (discussing how housework has been
historically and ideologically divided so that white wives' labor appears to focus
on high-value spiritual benefits to the household, with more menial tasks
relegated to racialized low-waged female workers).
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from paying above market rates for her domestic service
providers would be considered consumption for tax purposes, a
married primary breadwinner is still logically engaging in
consumption when he or she receives less directly tangible gains
from a homemaking spouse. If, for example, Homemaker
Hannah's time is freed from cleaning floors or daily cooking she
may have more time and energy to attend to Bob's emotional
needs, socialize with his prospective clients or partners, enhance
her appearance and health with gym and spa visits, attend to
Bob's health,' 61 engage in social capital building through
community volunteerism, entertain, or golf, proofread Bob's
memos or moot his legal arguments, or improve their home.
Even if these activities by a homemaking spouse do not
necessarily help enhance Bob's long-term economic well-being,
they may be a form of conspicuous consumption for the
breadwinning spouse-like designer suits or fancy cars-that
marks his class status.
If instead "shared consumption" by a non-breadwinning
spouse is presumed to be a purely altruistic one-way transfer
from the breadwinning spouse, the current tax rates inequitably
favor such altruism by married primary breadwinners over
similar altruism by unmarried breadwinners. The income-
splitting "bonus" departs from standard tax equity principles by
subtracting "gifts" to the non-breadwinning spouse from the
primary breadwinner's income. 162 Normally, gifts to family
members or friends count as evidence of the gift-giving
taxpayers' ability to pay higher taxes, not as a reason for
reducing the donor's tax liability. While Single Sophia might
similarly give some of her income to support several other
161 See Scott, supra note 107 (giving example of health care by affluent
breadwinner's wifc).
162 See Motro, supra note 7, at 1527 (analyzing the slippery line between
gifts, personal consumption and business expenses in affluent breadwinner-
homemaker marital income transfers).
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people 163 her altruism3 -will not count as income-sharing that
reduces her tax liability. Only gifts made to organizations
formally tailored to satisfy criteria for charitable deductions will
qualify, and these criteria in part aim to exclude "gifts" that in
fact produce reciprocal personal gain to the donor.164 For
example, Single Sophia might get a tax deduction for her gift to
the soup kitchen but not to needy family members or service
providers. Furthermore, unlike the income-splitting tax break for
married primary breadwinners, general tax deductions for
charitable gifts only apply to the extent that documented
qualifying tax deductions exceed the standard deduction level. 165
The income-splitting bonus for breadwinner-homemaker
marriages, in contrast, allows full deduction of half of the
breadwinner's income, regardless of how much the breadwinner
actually shares with the spouse, and requires no documentation
of actual income sharing.
In short, the "shared consumption" rationale for marital
income-splitting deviates from normal tax principles for
counting consumption when it treats married primary
breadwinners as consuming less than single breadwinners at
similar income. By failing to count transfers of income from
married primary breadwinners to homemaking spouses as gains
shared by both the breadwinners and the homemakers, the
"shared consumption" rationale ironically presumes that
consumption is distinctly not shared in breadwinner-homemaker
marriage. Further, this failure to count the consumption gains to
the married primary breadwinner echoes the traditional master-
servant relationship in which the status as husband was deemed
to normally and naturally confer entitlement to others' service
such that this service was a matter of unequal duty rather than
163 For example, she might buy medicine and groceries for her elderly
aunt; she might provide a holiday bonus to her building staff and housecleaner
(or perhaps even pay them at "family wage" levels sufficient to support their
own non-eaming spouses); she might buy school supplies for a niece and
nephew; or she might support a local soup kitchen that provides free meals to
people in poverty.
164 See generally I.R.C. § 170 (governing tax deductions for charitable
contributions); 170 (c)(2)(C) (excluding deductions for gains to private
individuals).
165 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1).
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mutual contractual exchange. 166 Thus, by specially exempting
the married primary breadwinner's household consumption from
taxation, marital income-splitting implicitly continues and
reinforces the assumption that those who conform to the affluent
white husband paradigm deserve special status-based support for
household service, whether menial or spiritual.
2. One Income, Two Producers?
An alternative approach to tax equity defends the income-
splitting bonus by treating the primary homemaking spouse as a
producer rather than a consumer draining family income. The
joint contribution rationale for marital income-splitting explains
that the income nominally and legally attributed to the
breadwinning spouse should instead be partly allocated to the
homemaker's labor. 167 In this view the tax code should treat the
specialized-homemaker as directly earning, despite not legally
owning, a portion of the breadwinner's wages, thereby
discounting the breadwinner's nominal earnings.' 68 The joint
contribution theory, however, presumes that the primary
homemaker contributes to the primary breadwinner's economic
gains, especially over the long term, not as a wage-earning
employee but more akin to a partner in a business or
investment. 169
166 See supra Part l.C.3; DUBBER, supra note 127, at 4-8 (discussing the
continuing influence of the idea of a separate sphere of governance based on the
ancient patriarchal household, in which a household master exercises authority
over wives and household servants as economic resources); HARTOG, supra note
123, at 101 (explaining the importance of status as husband).
167 See Motro, supra note 7, at 1518-22 (discussing and critiquing joint
ownership rationale); id. at 1526-27 (discussing and critiquing the collective
efforts rationale);
168 See Bittker, supra note II, at 1420 (explaining marital income-splitting
as recognition of joint contribution by spouses to the income realized within the
marriage).
169 See INST. FOR AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 142, at 8 (stating that
income-splitting tax benefits properly recognize marriage as "a joint venture of
enormous social importance in which husband and wife make equal
contributions").
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But if it makes sense to attribute part of Breadwinning
Bob's $100,000 income to Homemaker Hannah, on the theory
that it is the product of her productive labor, then it would
similarly make sense to attribute part of Single Sophia's
identical earnings to the specialized service providers whose
productive labor presumably contributes to her earning capacity.
As Shari Motro has astutely observed, the dual-producer
rationale for the income-splitting bonus presumes that married
primary breadwinners uniquely deserve to have their personal
expenses converted into deductible business expenses for tax
purposes. 170 The tax system is structured to-normally treat the
costs of contributions to taxpayers' current or potential work
income as personal consumption that adds to tax liability.' 71
Taxpayers cannot normally deduct from their taxable income
expenses for food, clothing, housing, homemaking, gym
memberships, recreation, routine health care, education or
transportation even though each of these could arguably
contribute substantially to present or future earning capacity.172
Although there are some exceptions to this principle-like the
home mortgage interest deduction-the general theory holds that
basic consumption expenses are recognized mainly through the
standard deduction and personal exemption that protects initial
earnings from taxation. Beyond this basic level, greater
consumption on personal goods and services indicates a greater
ability to pay, such that it determines rather than detracts from
tax liability. The income tax system, in general, treats expenses
that enhance business or investment gains differently from
expenses that enhance individual gains from labor. 173
170 Motro, supra note 7, at 1527.
"I' I.R.C. § 262 (denying deductions for "personal, living or family
expenses").
172 See Boris Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits and Subsidies for
Personal Expenditures, 16 J.L. & ECON. 193, 203-04 (1973) (explaining that it is
impossible to neatly distinguish between personal and business expenses since
some personal expenses will inevitably contribute to income production).
'73 See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW
STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 108 (11 th cd. 2009)
(concluding that "the tax law never has been interpreted to contemplate a
deduction for the everyday expenses of bcing employed").
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In effect, the joint contribution theory of marital income-
splitting recognizes the costs of being employed only for those
breadwinners who conform to the paradigm of the affluent,
heterosexual white husband. Not only does the income-splitting
policy effectively single out this group of breadwinners for a
special tax deduction that is effectively for the costs of
supporting market earning, but it also applies that special tax
deduction in an unusually favorable manner. The income-
splitting bonus gives the affluent married primary breadwinner
what amounts to an expense deduction simply for having a
spouse without other significant employment - in other words, it
supports a status rather than productive activity or actual
transaction. The typical tax deduction for business expenses
generally would require a legally recognized exchange of
payment for services or goods. 174 In contrast, under the current
marital income-splitting system, Breadwinner Bob gets a
deduction attributing part of his income to his spouse's labor
regardless of the amount of income he actually transfers.
Moreover, the joint contribution rationale for sheltering
breadwinners' marital income seems dubious since that rationale
is rejected to a great extent in legal treatment of homemakers'
claims against breadwinners' income. 175
In addition, the special tax deduction for the married
primary breadwinner's costs of breadwinning is especially
generous because it rejects even the pretense of a distinction
between leisure or luxury and more tangibly productive
activities, in contrast to restrictions on business expense
deductions that egregiously blur the line between entertainment
and production. 176 Breadwinning Bob and Homemaking Hannah
might hire paid workers for virtually all their domestic service,
or do without, so that Hannah can spend her days writing poetry;
pursuing her own education; volunteering at the local public
171 See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). (allowing deductions for business-rclatcd
"salaries or other compensation for services actually rendered").
175 See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing unenforceability of homemakers'
contracts for spousal compensation); Part II.A.I (discussing treatment of
homemakers on divorce).
171 See I.R.C. § 274 (disallowing certain entertainment, amusement, and
recreation expenses not directly related to business purposes).
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school; watching soap operas, getting manicures and shopping
for expensive clothes, or running for political office. The
income-splitting bonus rewards all of these activities equally as
contributions to Breadwinner Bob's income.
While the marital income-splitting scheme therefore may
seem designed to reward consumption rather than production, it
also is logically consistent with an idea of "husband care" that
blurs production and consumption for the privileged married
primary breadwinner. The income-splitting bonus is effectively
designed to recognize the distinctive productive value of the
status-enhancing consumption typically provided by a non-
earning (or low-earning) spouse to an affluent primary
breadwinner. The income-splitting bonus arguably subsidizes the
paradigmatic affluent white husband's enhanced social capital
from attachment to a spouse able to pursue (if not attain) upper-
class standards of health and beauty, luxury consumption, social
connections or community power. 177
In sum, marital income-splitting does not equitably
recognize the general fact that it typically takes more than one
person to achieve and maintain a successful worker. Instead, the
dual-producer rationale for income-splitting singles out the
production of an often gendered, racialized, sexualized and
class-based breadwinning status for special public support.
B. Equity Between Married Couples?
If the income-splitting bonus is unfair to single filing
taxpayers, is this unfairness nonetheless a reasonable tradeoff
necessary to achieve tax equity between married couples? One
could argue that Single Sophia pays the price of a tax system
that ensures Breadwinner Bob's household pays taxes equal to
those of other married couples with the same total income. In the
prevailing theory, the income-splitting bonus for one-
breadwinner marriages represents a seemingly benign, if tragic,
policy choice to resolve the problem that it is impossible to
design a tax system that achieves both equity between married
couples and marriage neutrality between married and single
177 See Zelenak, supra note 4, at 356 (noting that husbands may gain from
intangible services from a homemaking spouse, including enhanced status from a
"trophy wife").
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taxpayers. 178 The current system taxes married couples with
similar combined incomes the same, regardless of income
distribution within the marriage, by sacrificing neutrality
between married and single breadwinners with the same income.
Critics have argued that the prevailing "married couples'
equality" theory gets the equities wrong by failing to compare
the non-monetary gains of dual-breadwinner and one-
breadwinner marriages. 179 Viewing this failure through the lens
of "aid for husband care," however, demonstrates that the
"married couples' equality" rationale favors rather than ignores
non-monetary (or "imputed") gains. Understanding the flawed
reasoning of the married couples equality goal dissolves the
classic family tax equity dilemma. Eliminating the income-
splitting bonus would promote horizontal equity between both
married couples and married and unmarried taxpayers.
Consider Breadwinner Bob's classmate, Dominic, earning
$50,000 a year as a public interest lawyer, who is married to
Daniela, a nurse also earning $50,000 a year. Just like Bob and
Hannah, Dual-Breadwinners Dominic and Daniela file jointly as
a married couple with taxable income of $100,000; just like Bob
and Hannah, they owe $13,213 in federal taxes on that income
(assuming a simplified return under 2008 rates). 180  Their
equivalent tax situation reflects the governing married couples
equality principle.
Despite this supposed equality, shifting from a static
comparison of couples to a dynamic view of the breadwinners
reveals an inequity. Unlike Bob, neither Dominic nor Daniela
gets a tax break when changing tax-filing status from single to
married filing jointly. As a single taxpayer earning $50,000,
Dominic owed $6606 in income taxes (just like Daniela,
178 Bittker, supra note I1, at 1395; Zelenak, supra note 4, at 399-40;
McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 145, at 1590-92.
'79 See Motro, supra note 7, at 1528-29 (arguing that "couples neutrality"
does not support equal taxation of cqual-income married couples "who spend
different amounts of time performing wage labor).
1S0 Assuming a standard deduction of $10,900 and personal exemptions
totaling $7000. See I.R.S. Publ'n 501 (Dec. 16, 2008) (their taxable income
would be $82,100). For a tax of $13,213, see IRS, 2008 Tax Tables.
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assuming a simplified return under 2008 rates). Together, they
owe virtually the same in combined taxes, despite being married
(under 2008 rates, assuming simplified return) because the
marital rate is set at double the tax rate for a single filing
individual earning one-half the marital income.
Comparing notes with Bob, Dominic might wonder why
Bob's higher-earning career gives him a special tax bonus for
marrying. Bob (whose tax law course is fresh in his mind) might
explain that his marriage "bonus" is fair because it means that
both couples pay the same taxes after marriage on their equal
marital income of $100,000, on the theory that it would be unfair
for one-breadwinner marriages to be taxed more heavily simply
because their income is earned by one person, not two.
1. Income Distribution Matters
However, Dominic might counter, it should matter for tax
purposes that it takes two earners in the formal market, rather
than one, to earn the same income. After all, Dominic is aware
that progressive tax rates normally mean $100,000 in income is
treated differently if it is earned by one person rather than by
two or more. Ten of Dominic's low-income clients who each
earn $10,000 would pay much less in combined taxes than Bob
and Hannah despite the same combined income of $100,000.
Progressive tax rates recognize that if it takes ten, or two, rather
than one person to earn $100,000, that dispersed $100,000
earnings is likely to be more costly in terms of monetary and
non-monetary resources (time for leisure and informal labor)
than the same earnings concentrated in one individual, therefore
indicating a lower actual standard of living and lesser ability to
pay taxes. Comparing regular monetary expenses related to
work, for example, as two formal market workers Dominic and
Daniela are likely to spend more than Breadwinner Bob and
Homemaking Hannah on transportation to work (perhaps double
the public transit fares, or double the parking, gas and car
maintenance costs), and to have more aggregate costs for work-
related food and clothing, leaving the dual-breadwinning couple
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
with a lower standard of living considering income left over for
discretionary spending or savings. '8 1
Similarly, beyond modest income levels, higher individual
income typically reflects higher pay rates per hour rather than
simply a greater number of work hours,Breadwinner Bob's
$100,000 income probably does not mean his formal market
work consumes twice the hours as Dominic's at $50,000, but
instead that Dominic is compensated less per hour. At middle or
upper income levels, dual-earner marriages typically involve at
least one full-time breadwinner, rather than two workers who
both have half-time commitments to formal jobs along with
substantial time free from income earning. 182 In the United
States labor market, part-time jobs are heavily skewed toward
low-security, low-benefit, and low-income work. 182 For that
reason, dual-breadwinning marriages above. low-income levels
generally have less total time free from market work for unpaid
homemaking or leisure than one-breadwinner marriages with
comparable combined income.
While Breadwinner Bob and Homemaker Hannah together
can likely take care of much of their daily domestic labor and
formal market work during the workday, leaving time for
evening leisure or for long-term development of human capital,
Dual-Breadwinners Dominic and Daniela will likely spend their
evenings and weekends doing daily caretaking chores like
181 See Lawrence Zelenak, The Income Tax and the Costs of Earning a
Living, 56 TAX L. REv. 39 (2002) (noting that studies on work expenses have not
compared one-earner and two-carnCr couples); Sandra L. Hanson & Thcodora
Ooms, The Economic Costs and Rewards of Two-Earner, Two-Parent Families,
53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 622, 631 (1991) (finding work-related expenses may
offset an average of sixty-eight percent of a higher-income wife's earnings, fifty-
six percent of a middle-income wife's earnings, and forty-six percent for low-
income wives); see also LINDA KELLEY, Two INCOMES AND STILL BROKE?
(1996) (giving popular advice for figuring the costs of substituting formal work
for homemaking).
182 JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 72, at 132 (explaining that the U.S.
dual-earning couples work an average of 81.2 hours a week, much more than in
many other countries with better support for part-time work).
182 See MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 131 (explaining how fringe benefit
rules "slant" the employment market to make part-time jobs particularly
disadvantageous).
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shopping, cooking, cleaning, laundry and home repairs. If
Dominic shirks household chores and relies on Daniela to
sacrifice her leisure or physical and mental well-being to give
him both leisure and domestic services, he may risk losing both
money income and non-commodified benefits if Daniela's
double shift strains their marriage, her physical and mental
health, or her income-earning potential. Even if Daniela is
willing and able to sacrifice her own leisure or caretaking needs
to maximize Dominic's gain, it will be difficult for a less-than-
superhuman breadwinning spouse to provide comparable
domestic services as Homemaking Hannah on top of the
demands of market work.
Alternatively, Dominic and Daniela may "buy" more
leisure by eating out and hiring a housekeeper or other domestic
service providers, leaving less money for savings or other
consumption spending compared to Breadwinner Bob and
Homemaking Hannah. Or, the dual-breadwinning couple may
skimp on domestic chores or sleep, sacrificing some quality of
life or physical and mental well-being.18 3 If they were to take on
daily caretaking for a child or other dependent family members,
they can expect to assume a big drop in income or a big increase
in spending.
2. Not a Problem of "Imputed Income"
As this hypothetical suggests, a full-time breadwinner with
a homemaking spouse who is freed from substantial market
work likely has a higher standard of living at the same total
household income than a full-time breadwinner who is married
to another breadwinner also devoting substantial time to formal
market work. But in the conventional theory, this disparity
between marriages with equal income stems from the general
183 See SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, JOHN P. ROBINSON, & MELISSA A. MILKIE,
CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 89-91 (2006) (finding that
employed married mothers get an average of four hours less sleep per week and
spend less time on some leisure activities than non-employed married mothers,
and also finding that dual eaming couples spend less time on housework).
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
problem of the income tax system's focus on money income.18 4
In his foundational analysis of family taxation, Boris Bittker
argues that it would be inequitable to increase taxes on one-
breadwinner marriages to account for the value of unpaid
household services when other households may similarly gain
from comparably valuable but untaxed non-monetized
services. 185
McIntyre and Oldman develop this defense of the married
couples equality principle by arguing that the perceived
advantages of one-breadwinner marriages rest on tenuous
stereotypes and other subjective judgments that conflate
increased leisure with increased non-commodified or "imputed"
income in the one-breadwinner marriage. 186 As they explain, the
one clear advantage that one-breadwinner marriages have over
two-breadwinner marriages (and over single earners) with
similar incomes is increased time free from market
production. 87 But they argue that whether a married couple
replaces purchased domestic services with their own labor rather
than leisure depends far more on economic class and personal
predilection than on whether the couple has two market incomes
or one. ' 88 For example, Homemaker Hannah may watch soap
operas or drink lattes at Starbucks all day while Dual-
Breadwinner Daniela and Dominic, or Single Sophia, might
spend late nights and weekends growing, canning and cooking
their own food, doing their own home repairs, laundry and
housecleaning.
McIntyre and Oldman conclude that taxing one-
breadwinner marriages more than dual-breadwinner marriages
with similar monetary income would amount to a tax on leisure
181 See, e.g., Bittkcr, supra note 11, at 1425-26 (noting that Congress is
not likely to change the law to value such services for inclusion in taxable
income); see also Zelenak, supra note 4, at 375 (noting that the non-taxation of
"imputed income" is a general rule not limited to wives).
85 Bittker, supra note I1, at 1426.
6 McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 145, at 1614-17.
187 Id. at 1617.
18
8 Id. at 1614-16.
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time inconsistent with general tax equity principles. 189 After all,
if time free from labor market demands is treated as taxable
gain, then many of the lowest-income persons, such as the
unemployed, students, children, retired persons and people too
ill to work-as well as full-time homemakers-deserve higher
taxes. A number of tax scholars have taken that approach,
suggesting that imputed income can and should be measured and
should require taxing non-earning or low-earning homemakers
and others more heavily than others. 190
But evaluating the fairness of equal taxation of one-
breadwinner and two-breadwinner affluent marriages does not
require resolving the inevitably subjective question of whether
low market income reflects high non-monetized gain rather than
simply low economic resources or leisure. Applied consistently,
progressive taxation of monetary income arguably can serve as a
good proxy for ability to pay considering both monetary income
and non-commodified resources like informal domestic labor. In
principle, a policy of progressively taxing only monetary (or
otherwise commodified) gain can reflect a reasonable
assumption that informal, unpaid gains often have particular
disadvantages in the current complex, capitalist, monetized
economy. Non-commodified gains are likely to be more difficult
than monetary income to save, control, trade, invest, transfer,
hoard or protect from risk or from sharing with others. 192 Some,
but certainly not all, low-monetary-income artists, students,
subsistence farmers, homemakers or community activists may be
happier and arguably more productive for society than many
high-income earners. Nonetheless, a higher tax burden for
higher-income earners, regardless of this income's "real" value
to self or society, can appropriately reflect the progressive
principle that increased monetary income brings a generally
increased ability and obligation to transfer some of that
monetary income to others in the form of taxes.
189 Id. at 1617.
1' See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1623-24
(1996) (arguing for taxation of women's informal household labor by increasing
taxes on households with wives or mothers, based on number of family members
and women's market work hours).
192 See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, progressive taxation limited to commodified
income can reflect that, beyond modest income levels, higher
income typically means higher pay rates (and often more
flexible work hours). It can also reflect that at higher pay rates
each formal dollar earned requires less sacrifice of time for
informal domestic labor or leisure. The minimum wage worker
earning $10,000 a year typically will not have ten times more
time free from market work than one taxpayer earning $100,000
a year. Progressively taxing one earner's concentrated $100,000
money income more than the ten $10,000 earners combined
recognizes that the same nominal dollar amount of income can
have different "real," including nonmonetary, costs and benefits
depending on the distribution of income among individuals.
3. Ignoring Exchange of Income for Services
This view of progressive tax rates shows that, contrary to
conventional theory, the principle of married couples equality
fails to count the monetary advantage that comes from being an
affluent, primary, breadwinner married to a primary homemaker
as taxable gain. The prevailing married couples equality theory
elides the fact that the one-breadwinner household's economic
advantages over dual-breadwinning marriages with the same
"pooled" monetary income come not from non-monetary gain in
itself but from specialization and exchange. 191
The standard analysis describes the non-monetary
advantages of one-breadwinner affluent marriages as "imputed
income," typically defined as "self-performed" goods and
services. 192 That standard characterization obscures the
breadwinner's gains from the primary homemaker's specialized
labor. The non-breadwinning homemaker spouse typically
191 Note, The Case for Mandatory Separate Filing by Married Persons, 91
YALE L.J. 363, 377-78 (1981) (explaining that understanding of the
breadwinner-homemaker marriage as an exchange of income for domestic
services leaves little justification for joint filing on grounds of horizontal equity
between married couples).
192 See McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 145, at 1614 (discussing the
problem of unpaid household labor as imputed income from "self-performed
services"); Zelenak, supra note 4,,at 362 (discussing the advantage of a one-
breadwinner marriage as increased "imputed income" from "self-performed"
household services).
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provides informal services not just for herself or himself, but
also for a spouse who does less informal household labor. 193 The
crucial economic advantage of the one-breadwinner affluent
marriage is that the gains from the homemaker's labor typically
are not simply "self-provided" but rather are produced by a
presumed exchange between two individuals, one specializing in
money gains and one in non-monetary gains.
It is arguably consistent with progressive tax principles to
exempt an individual's informal services to herself or himself
from taxable income, such as the value of Single Sophia's non-
commodified labor of preparing her own meals. To the extent
informal work by Single Sophia, or by Dual-Breadwinners
Dominic and Daniela, contributes to "human capital"-the
ability to produce monetary gain by working-that gain will not
be taxed until it is realized in the form of market earnings. Non-
commodified gains that are in fact self-produced impose
particular costs on that person such as the difficulty of
transferring and liquidating those gains and the fact that limited
individual time and mortality requires tradeoffs between time
spent on leisure, informal labor and market labor.
In contrast, it is fair and logical in a progressive income tax
system focused on realized gains 196 to treat gains from
exchanges of services for money as taxable events. If Dual-
Breadwinner Dominic or Single Sophia pays a restaurant for a
meal, he or she will be taxed on the earnings used to buy the
services and the restaurant workers will also be taxed on the
income they receive from this payment. With an exchange, the
question of the nature and amount of the gain becomes moot
since the exchange itself establishes both the value and the fact
that it counts as a service. For tax purposes, it does not matter
whether the chef who provides the food is motivated by love or
"I See, e.g., David Hasen, Liberalism and Ability Taxation, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1057, 1072 (2007) (stating that the income-splitting system taxing the
married couple as a unit makes the normative assumption that the "nonworking
spouse does not derive an income-likc benefit from the fact that he does not
work" (emphasis added)).
196 For a discussion of how imputed income from consumption of personal
services fits the general principle of taxing only realized income, see Mary
Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 722,
781-86(1990).
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money, thinks of the food preparation work as leisure or labor, or
even whether Dominic or Sophia throws out the food after
paying for it because they only want to enjoy the ambiance of
the restaurant, to cultivate friendships with the chef or other
patrons or to support the chef. Regardless of purpose or wisdom
of the trade, the money Dominic or Sophia spend in exchange
for services counts as after-tax consumption. In contrast, if
Breadwinner Bob relies on Homemaking Hannah to cook his
meals while he brings home the money she uses to consume
other goods--or even if he does the cooking or goes out to eat
but shares his money with her simply for her companionship--
the income-splitting provision exempts his transfer of money to
Hannah from his income as if it were a deductible expense. 194
Perhaps the married couples equality rationale assumes
formal marriage creates a unitary entity, erasing what would
otherwise seem to be an exchange between two persons such
that Hannah's services should be treated as self-produced,
untaxable "imputed income" just like Sophia's preparation of her
own meal. But the income-splitting provision has it both ways: it
erases the spousal exchange of money for services just as it
counts it. Marital income splitting treats the primary
breadwinner's monetary gain as if it were shared between two
persons-shifting half of Breadwinner Bob's income to
Homemaker Hannah. But then marital income-splitting rates
effectively collapse the marriage into a single person, erasing the
transfer from Bob to Hannah, by taxing that money on a pre-tax
basis as if Bob, and his gains from the breadwinning-
homemaking exchange, did not exist.
In sum, the income-splitting bonus for one-breadwinner
affluent marriages violates rather than conforms to the generally
equitable tax principle of using monetary income as the measure
of ability to pay progressive monetary taxes. The marital
income-splitting scheme monetizes the homemaker's unpaid
labor by attributing some of the breadwinner's monetary income
directly to the spouse specializing in non-monetary gain. At the
same time, the income-splitting scheme gives special treatment
to the monetary gains in one-breadwinner marriages by
exempting the breadwinning spouse from the progressive tax
'94 See Motro, supra note 7, at 1527 and accompanying text.
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rates that would normally accompany individual specialization
in monetary earnings.
By comparing married couples as aggregate units, the
married couples equality rationale for marital income-splitting
covers up this policy's deviation from the principle that
distribution matters for tax equity purposes. Tax scholarship has
often attributed the supposed dilemma between couples equality
and marriage neutrality as a failing of a progressive tax system,
because without progressive rates couples equality would not
lead to marriage bonuses or penalties. 9 But that view gets it
backwards: The married couple's equality rationale poses a
problem in a progressive system precisely because it rejects
standard progressive tax principles without acknowledging that
it does so. The married couple's equality rationale implicitly
assumes that affluent husbands deserve special, regressive tax
support for their gains from domestic services by non-
breadwinning wives.
C. Equity For Breadwinner-Dependent Households?
1. Earning and Caring for Dependent
Imagine that Breadwinner Bob has another law school
classmate, Heather, who is single and also works at his law firm,
earning an identical salary of $100,000. Assume that the same
year Bob gets married, Heather becomes a single parent.
Heather, like Bob, now provides monetary income supporting
two people in hei household. Like Bob, Heather's tax status
changes with her new family status. Heather now files as a "head
of household," paying a tax of $15,719 on her income of
195 See Zelenak, supra note 4, at 339 (describing the inequities of marriage
taxation as a problem of progressivity and joint returns).
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$100,000,196 compared to her previous tax of $19,479 on the
same income as a single person with no dependents. 1
97
But heads of households are taxed at a higher rate than
jointly filing married couples with the same income. The head of
household tax rate is about sixty percent of the marital income-
splitting rates. In addition, a dependent gets a lower standard
deduction than a spouse or single filing person. A head of
household with one dependent gets standard deductions totaling
$8000 for two people while a marital household gets double the
single deduction of $5,450, for a total of $10,900. Although
Head of Household Heather and Breadwinner Bob each support
a non-earner on equal $100,000 incomes, Heather pays $2407
more in annual taxes ($15,719 compared to $13,312, assuming a
simplified return under 2008 rates). 198
Although these disadvantages are somewhat offset by the
availability of other deductions or credits for dependents, family
tax breaks targeted to care for dependents tend to be
substantially less generous than the income-splitting benefit to
family care for affluent breadwinners. In the example above,
Head of Household Heather would get a maximum credit for
child care expenses of $600 (assuming more than $3000 of paid
expenses), a benefit not available to married couples unless both
have earned income. 199 Yet this is far less than the greater
standard deduction and income-splitting available to some
married couples. Most heads of households, like married
parents, will be able to also get a child tax credit of $1000 per
child, but these credits are phased out at a lower income level-
$75,000 for single parents and $110,000 for married
196 A Head of Household with standard deduction of $8000, total
exemptions of $7000, under 2008 rates would have a taxable income of $85,000;
for a tax of $16,319, minus a child care expenses tax credit of $600. See I.R.S:
Publ'n 501(Dec. 16, 2008) and the 2008 Tax Table. Taxable income of $85,000;
tax of SI 6,319, minus credit of $600 for a total tax of $15,719.
197 A single individual with a $100,000 income, a standard deduction of
$5,450 and a personal exemption of $3500 would have taxable income of
$91,050; for a 2008 tax rate of $19,479.
198 See supra notes 199, 200.
99 I.R.C. § 21(d) (2010).
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breadwinners with one or more children. 200 As a result, this
benefit would be available to Bob and Hannah if they had a
dependent, but not to Heather and her child with the same
$100,000 income. Furthermore, the income-splitting benefit has
a major structural advantage over typical exemptions, deductions
and credits because the tax reduction from income-splitting
automatically rises with inflation without the need for
Congressional action. For this reason, the tax support directed
specifically for dependents has eroded in value over the last
several decades, 2 1 unlike the marital income-splitting rate
providing "aid for affluent husband care."
Besides owing higher annual taxes than Breadwinning Bob
on the same income, Heather's time for caring for herself is
likely to change significantly when she becomes a caretaker for
a dependent. One can imagine that Heather comes home from
her demanding work day not to a well-organized house with
dinner on the stove and the laundry folded, but to a person in
need of comprehensive care. To maintain both her job and her
child, Heather will need to enlist one or more caretakers, with
high quality paid care likely to cost at least $10,000 a year for
day care centers and $15,000 or more for an in-home nanny.20 2
As a result, while Breadwinner Bob supports two people on his
$100,000 earnings, Head of Household Heather is likely to
effectively support three people (or perhaps four, counting the
cleaners, restaurant workers, and maintenance people that
Heather probably needs to rely upon even more than Single
Sophia). Moreover, even with full-time child-care help,
parenting is likely to cut into Heather's work time, due to child's
200 I.R.C. § 21(b)(2) (2010).
201 C. EUGENE. STEUERLE, URBAN INST., TAXING QUESTIONS FOR ALL THE
FAMILY (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?lD=1000003
(explaining that the declining value of dependent exemptions through the 1980s
has not been fully offset by new tax allowances for families with children).
202 A January 2009 survey of child care costs found that the costs of full
time center-based care in 2008 averaged over $10,000 in many states (not
considering quality), and that the highest state average (that of Massachusetts)
was $15,895. NACCRRA, PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE: 2009
UPDATE app. I 22-23 (2009) (surveying child care referral centers nationwide).
A nanny paid the required federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour for a forty-
five hour work week for fifty weeks would cost $16,312.50.
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medical and educational appointments, illnesses, vacations and
scheduling conflicts, among other things.20 3
2. Privileging Husband Care over Dependent Care
Comparing her tax payment with Breadwinner Bob's, Head
of Household Heather might wonder why tax policy gives more
public support to sole family breadwinners receiving caretaking
from non-earning homemakers than to sole family breadwinners
without non-earning spouses who also take care of dependents.
Breadwinner Bob might respond by explaining that if he and
Hannah have a dependent child, he will not be able to split his
income with his child and his wife. Tax policy generally rejects
income-splitting with dependents in keeping with the normal
progressivity principle barring taxpayers from shifting income to
someone in a lower tax bracket, except as an after-tax
transaction like a gift or payment for services. 20 4 For example,
the "kiddie tax" restricts the amount of income affluent parents
can shelter from high tax rates through property transfers to
minor children. 20 5
In contrast to extensive discussions of "married couples'
equality," tax scholarship and policy has been conspicuously
silent on the reasoning for different tax rates for married
taxpayers and heads of households. Macintyre and Oldman's
classic family tax article describes the head of household tax
rates as tax support for a "phantom spouse," who receives a
lesser part of the breadwinner's income than a "real"
203 See JOAN C. WILLIAMS & HEATHER BOUSHEY, CTR. FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS, THE THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT: THE POOR, THE
PROFESSIONALS, AND THE MISSING MIDDLE 54-55 (2010) (explaining the
difficulties, discrimination and costs parents face in seeking to accommodate
parenting responsibilities in a professional career).
204 See Stephanie HotTer, Adopting the Fanily Taxable Unit, 76 U. CIN. L.
REV. 55 (2007) (criticizing current policy and advocating full income splitting as
a pro-natalist policy encouraging families of affluent breadwinners to bear more
children).
205 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 1411, 100 Stat. 2085
(1986) (codified as I.R.C. § I(g) (2010)).
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homemaking wife.206 Lawrence Zelenak concludes that the
differential has no rational basis in terms of tax equity, but is
simply the historical result of a political compromise. 20 7 When
Congress instituted the income splitting marital rates in 1948,
some argued that not having a homemaking wife made a
breadwinner most deserving of tax support through reduced
rates, especially if the breadwinner had dependents needing
caretaking as well as income support, such as children, elderly
parents or other relative disabled from work.208As one comment
noted in hearings on the 1948 reform, marital income-splitting
would leave out:
[T]he many thousands of cases where the
father of minor children would after his wife's
death, be deprived of her aid and
companionship at the very time that his
Federal taxes would be increased up to 40
percent because he no longer is in the favored
group.20 9
This comment suggests how the head of household tax rate was
shaped by concern with caretaking for affluent husbands.
In the early 1950s, Congress responded to concerns about
the disparity between breadwinners with homemaking spouses
and unmarried breadwinners with dependents by adding reduced
rates for a narrow group of surviving spouses as well as for
heads of households. 210  With these changes, widows or
widowers with dependents effectively continue to receive the
206 McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 145, at 1602.
207 Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the income Tax, 49 TAx L. REV. 349,
404 (1994); see also Bittker, supra note I1, at 1417-18 (discussing Congress's
interest in partially extending income-splitting benefits to single breadwinners
supporting dependents).
20I ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN AND
THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 196-99
(2001).
20- Id. at 196-97 (citations omitted).
210 Bittker, supra note I1, at 1418.
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full income-splitting benefit that would be available to a
breadwinner-homemaker marriage for two years after the death
of one spouse, unless the spouse remarries. 211 This provision
effectively works to continue the "aid for affluent husband care"
during a period of transition after death to allow some time to
secure a new homemaking spouse, although it also (temporarily)
benefits surviving spouses of dual-breadwinner marriages with
dependents. In addition, it can be understood to allow an affluent
married breadwinner with a homemaking spouse to continue to
provide tax-favored income after death to support the
homemaker in a period of transition from homemaker to
breadwinner or to marriage to a new breadwinner. This
exception implicitly rejects the theory of income splitting as
compensation for the costs of a non-earning spouse's
consumption or income-pooling, because then the death of such
a spouse would provide a net financial gain to a primary.
What policy goals, then, are served by providing only
partial income-splitting benefits for heads of households, who
incur the costs of dependent care without the informal gains
from a homemaking spouse? By making. the tax shelter for
unmarried dependent caretaking generally less valuable than the
tax shelter for homemaking, the head of household tax rates
logically operate as a kind of "husband care insurance" for
married primary breadwinners with dependents. Some members
of Congress were concerned that full income-splitting would
create incentives for divorce by married parents with two
children who could divide into two breadwinner-dependent
households.2 12
In reality, the economic burdens of combining both
breadwinning and dependent caretaking in the current American
context are so substantial that the denial of full income splitting
is not an issue relevant to most single parents or other sole
breadwinners caring for dependents. Only twenty percent of all
single parents with dependent children generate enough income
to pay any federal income tax, and many of those households
211 See I.R.C. § l(a)(2) (2010) (stating requirements for inclusion of
surviving spouses in marital rates).
212 KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 211, at 199 (discussing the Scnatc's
rejection of a proposal for full incomc-splitting for heads of household in 1951).
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will pay so little tax that income-splitting would not provide a
substantial benefit. 213 Even for married breadwinners with
dependents, where two parents are available to divide market
earning and family caretaking, an income-splitting tax break for
dependents would not work well to support dependent care,
since nearly half of all children live in households with income
too low to pay income tax. 2 14
213 WILLIAM G. GALE, TAX POLICY CTR., TAX BRACKET AND TAX
LIABILITIES FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN (2004), available at http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/ 1000707_TaxFactI 11-22-04.pdf.
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In short, by favoring affluent breadwinners with non-
earning spouses over those with non-earning dependents, tax
policy directs support for unpaid domestic care to married
primary breadwinners-usually husbands -more than to
dependents. Because most high-earners married to non-earners
are white men, and because most unmarried, dependent-
caretaking heads of households are women (though at these high
income levels perhaps less so), more favorable spousal income-
splitting rates compared to head of household income-splitting
rates work to particularly aid wives' unpaid care for affluent
white husbands over unpaid care for children by mothers.
VIII. Current Policy Updates Historical Inequities
The current marital income-splitting rates are a product of
historical contingencies as well as theories of equitable
taxation. 215  This system should be understood not as an
unfortunate leftover from an uncontested or accidental past, but
instead as a strategic political revival of problematic values and
inequitable policies privileging "affluent husband care."
A. Joint Taxation as Support For Unpaid Affluent
Husband Care
The 1948 change to joint marital taxation at income-
splitting marital rates did not simply have the effect of protecting
the breadwinner-homemaker marital family that was both a
widely accepted ideal and a demographic trend in the postwar
period. 216 Nor did this 1948 change simply restore geographical
uniformity after federal tax law was interpreted to allow marital
income-splitting only for residents in states with community
215 Zelenak, supra note 4, at 347.
216 See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Saving Seaborn: Ownership as the Basis of
Family Taxation, in UC DAvis LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 87-93
& nn.556-557 (Research Paper Ser. No. 166, 2009), available at http://
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papcrs.cfm?abstract-id=1374493 (discussing the vision of
the marital family that shaped the shift to marital income splitting). Ventry notes
that although married couples comprised 80% of all households at this time, the
income splitting benefits "accrued disproportionately to a small cohort of
wealthy taxpayers." Id. at 93 & nn.556-557.
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property laws. 21 7 The particular method Congress chose to
achieve the policy goals of supporting national protection for
breadwinner-homemaker marriage privileged a particular,
contested vision of the breadwinner-homemaker marriage
centered on affluent husbands' entitlement to caretaking by
unpaid wives. 218
The 1948 federal income-splitting reform extended the tax
benefits of community property to affluent husbands in other
states219 but did so in a way that protected the existing common
law rights, of breadwinning husbands to control marital income.
Carolyn Jones explains that popular media stories of this time
often defended this common law regime with horror stories of
hard-working husbands losing "their" money to selfish and
immoral wives under community property laws. 220 In reality,
homemaking wives' rights to earnings from breadwinning
husbands tended to be more a matter of form rather than
217 See Poe v. Scaborn, 282 U.S. IOI (1930) (holding that federal tax law
should treat marital income as equally divided among spouses for married
couples in community property states).
218 Even though other policies arguably would have better promoted
feminist goals, organized women's groups did not necessarily challenge the
move to income-splitting, which was consistent with the immediate interests of
some homemaking wives' in reducing taxes on their affluent husbands' earnings.
See Stephanie McMahon, To Save State Residents: States Use of Community
Property for Federal Tax Reduction, 27 L. & HIST. REV. 585, 596-97, 612-13
(2009).
219 See Zelenak, supra note 4, at 345-46 (citing legislative history
explaining the goal of "geographic equalization" and identifying husbands'
interests as the central issue).
220 Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and
Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259, 270-71 (1988).
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substance under community property laws.221 Congress could
have achieved the goals of tax uniformity and tax savings for
breadwinner-homemaker families by linking marital tax benefits
to substantive income sharing, as in one proposal that Jones
explains.2 22  Proponents of that alternative explain that a
substantive income-splitting requirement "rewards a wife for
substantial services contributed toward the accumulations of the
marriage" while a general income-splitting tax rule would do
"nothing in the way of improving the wife's position in
society. '223
Legislative history provides some evidence that Congress
joined popular defenders of husbands' common law status in
understanding income-splitting as a policy aimed at maintaining
the homemaking wife's position as financial dependent serving
the husband rather than as an equal financial partner in the
marriage. 224 One reason the Senate Finance Committee report
gave for supporting the 1948 income-splitting scheme was that it
would reduce incentives for more substantive marital income-
shifting through trusts, joint tenancies and family
partnerships. 225 Jones argues that Congressional rejection of a
substantive income-shifting requirement was motivated not only
221 McMahon, supra note 221, at 592, 604-05, 620 (discussing the change
to community property in Western states and in Pennsylvania as motivated by tax
and other purposes rather than by women's rights). Although opposition to
women's marital economic equality motivated some of the resistance to
community property that does not mean proponents of community property
conversely aimed to empower women. Id. at 616. Nonetheless, this lack of
support for homemaking women's marital rights among politically powerful
voices on both sides of the debate underscores, rather than negates, the political
importance of gender ideology and interest in shaping the resulting tax policy.
222 Jones, supra note 223, at 295.
223 ld.
224 Some suggest that family harmony would be weakened if homemaking
wives gained rights to share income from a breadwinning husband. Id. at 271
(quoting a Nebraska newspaper editorial arguing that community property laws
undermined the economic pressure that can keep families together in times of
stress).
225 Id. at 294 n.252 (citing S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 26
(1948)).
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by concerns of administrative difficulties, but also by a
particular ideology of gender and marriage.22 6 For example, she
notes that tax expert and legislative counsel Stanley Surrey
explains this reform would be beneficial because wives would
not need to "continue to master the details of the retail drug
business, electrical equipment business, or construction
business, but may turn from their partnership 'duties' to the
pursuit of homemaking. 2 27
Moreover, the 1948 income-splitting reform did not simply
target the demographically prevailing breadwinner-homemaker
family for tax support, but instead skewed tax benefits toward an
affluent minority of breadwinners at the expense of the majority
of breadwinner-homemaker families of the time. Post-war
federal tax reforms could have given tax relief to most
breadwinner-homemaker married couples by restoring the highly
progressive pre-war income tax through expanded personal
exemptions or an expanded bottom tax-free bracket. 228 Edward
McCaffery explains that the 1948 introduction of joint marital
rates directed about 15 percent of the total post-war peace
dividend to no more than 10 percent of all married taxpayers. 229
In 1951, for example, only those with marital income over
$10,000 (the equivalent of over $84,000 a year in 2008
226 Id. at 294.
227 Id. at 296 (quoting Stanley Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The
Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1111 (1948)). Historian Alice
Kessler-Harris argues that Congress dismissed concerns about the impact on
women, quoting a member of Congress explaining that "[tihe wife's position in
that joint income tax return ... is in there for the purpose of reducing taxes of the
husband." ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND
THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 2 0 TH CENTURY AMERICA, 196 (2001)
(quoting California Representative Bertrand W. Gearhart, Revenue Revisions,
1947, part 2, 888).
228 KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 211, at 194.
229 MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 54.
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dollars2 30 ) could benefit from the income-splitting tax shelter.231
McCaffery notes that Senator Hubert Humphrey unsuccessfully
attempted to replace the 1948 reform several years later with an
alternative benefit aimed at helping the more typical "married
man."
232
B. The Marriage Penalty as Protection for Affluent
Husband Care
In 1969, Congress replaced the full marital income-
splitting system with rates conferring a reduced income-splitting
benefit on married primary breadwinners in order to reduce the
higher tax rates on single breadwinners with similar income. 233
Ironically, the recent marriage tax reforms have largely reversed
this change, reviving the 1948 system's marital income-splitting
rates as the way to update the tax system for the twenty-first
century family. 234
The 1969 marital tax system's dual-breadwinning
"marriage penalty" was an easy target for criticism, especially
given the increasing dependence of middle class families on
wives' earnings in the subsequent decades. 235 Because the
reduced income-splitting benefit of that system taxed relatively
equal-earning spouses as if their income were somewhat
unequal, many dual-breadwinning married couples lost the
benefits of progressivity that they would have received as two
single taxpayers with relatively equal incomes. Under the 1969
230 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm, (last visited July 5, 2010).
231 See MCCAFFERY supra note 4, at 59 (citing Senator Eugene Millikin in
a discussion of 1951 reforms proposed by Senator Hubert Humphrey).
232 Id. at 59 (citing RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES
611-13 (1954)).
233 See Zelenak, supra note 10, at 6 (explaining the history of the
"marriage penalty").
234 See infra Part III.C.
23 See supra notes 57-60; Part 1.B.5.
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reform, a husband and wife who each earned $50,000 could be
taxed as if one earned roughly $70,000 and the other $30,000.236
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the 1969 goal of
reducing the "singles penalty" did not in itself produce this
regressive effect on equal-earning marriages. As part of the 1969
reform plan, Congress created a new rate which taxed separately
filing married persons at a higher rate than single filing
persons. 237 Without closing off the option of separate marital
filing at single rates, which existed prior to 1969, equal-earning
married couples would seek to take advantage of the lower
singles rates.238 However, as Boris Bittker explains, Congress
rejected such an option out of concern that it would restore the
pre-1948 marital disparity that favored affluent breadwinners
who transfer (or at least appear to transfer) substantive rights to
monetary income to their homemaking wives.239
The 1969 changes took a specific additional step beyond
adjusting the gap between single and married primary
breadwinners to also preserve a gap between one-breadwinner
affluent marriages and dual-breadwinner marriages. The new
system ensured that all married couples with the same joint
income paid the same joint taxes. But "married couples equality"
was achieved by taking away the benefits of progressive rates
for married equal-earning breadwinners compared to what they
otherwise would have received filing singly or separately,
preserving special protection from progressive tax rates for
married high-earners in unequal-earning marriages compared to
236 Id.
237 Bittkcr, supra notc II, at 1429.
238 Id.
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what those breadwinners would have received if single or
separately filing. 240
C. Enhanced Aid for Unpaid Husband Care in the
2001-04 Reforms
By the end of the twentieth century, political concern about
the penalty on dual-breadwinning marriages led to the enactment
of comprehensive marriage tax reforms in 2001 through 2004.24,
Problematically, these reforms solved the dual-breadwinning
"marriage penalty" problem of the 1969 regime by undoing the
system's protection for single breadwinners without addressing
the more* fundamental problem that the 1969 system privileged
one-breadwinner affluent marriages under the guise of "marriage
equality." As a result, even while eliminating the 1969 system's
overt "marriage penalty" for most middle-class taxpayers, the
reforms reinforced a system of family tax support skewed
against most non-wealthy breadwinners and homemakers, both
single and married.
1. Expanding Tax Aid for Unpaid Husband Care
First, the reforms of the early 2000s raised married
taxpayers' joint standard deduction to twice the amount for
single taxpayers, up from 1.67 times the single taxpayer's
standard deduction under the 1969 system. 242 This change means
that dual-breadwinning marriages no longer lose part of their
tax-free earnings compared to what they would get as single
240 Of course, if Congress had not penalized equal-brcadwinning
marriages by closing the option of filing at the more progressive singles rates,
the 1969 singles reform would have been more costly in terms of lost revenue.
But that means Congress chose to increase support for affluent single
breadwinners, and also to preserve support for affluent husband care, at the
expense of support for breadwinners in equal-earning marriages.
241 See sources cited supra note I.
242 See Susan Kalinka, Highlights of the 2001 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act, 64 LA. L. REv. 214, 223-24, 228 (2004) (discussing the
standard deduction changes in EGTRRA and JGTRAA); William G. Gale &
Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Ta Policy in the Bush
Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1157, 1162 (2004) (explaining how
EGTRRA changed the marital versus single standard deduction); see also I.R.C.
§ 63 (2010) (codifying standard deduction changes).
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taxpayers when they do not itemize deductions. This change also
means that married primary breadwinners gain an even greater
tax-free portion of earnings compared to what they would get as
single taxpayers when they do not itemize deductions.
Second, Congress gradually expanded the fifteen percent
tax bracket for married couples to reach twice the income for
single taxpayers in that bracket increasing from 1.67 times the
previous single taxpayer rates.2 43 In addition to the support for
married breadwinners, the 2001 legislation provided more
modest help for the support of dependents by expanding the
child tax credit from $500 to $1000.2 44 hese family tax reforms
were scheduled to expire in 2010, and this sunset date has been
extended for two more years. 245
As a result of the return to the pre-1969 full income-
splitting rates, dual-breadwinners Dominic and Daniela get taxed
at the same progressive rates as single taxpayers with the same
income. But the reforms of 2001 through 2004 continue to
penalize these modest-earning, married dual-breadwinners by
denying them the tax advantage given to breadwinners of equal
individual income who marry a non-earner or a low-earner.
Indeed, by returning to the 1948 system of full marital income-
splitting for most taxpayers, the recent marriage reforms
substantially increase the tax bonus to one-breadwinner
marriages that effectively supports unpaid "husband care."
2. Reinforcing Support for Affluent Husband Care
Although the 2001-04 marriage tax reforms did reduce tax
rates for most middle-class married breadwinners, the largest
243 Kalinka, supra note 245, at 227.
244 Id. at 232-33.
245 See Gregg Esenwicn, Extending the 2001, 2003, and 2004 Tax Cuts,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RS21992, June 10, 2005 (explaining that this
sunset provision was included to avoid a Senate rule governing "extraneous
matter" in budget reconciliation legislation). In 2010, a political deal extended
the sunset date for the Bush administration's package of tax cuts, including these
marital tax reforms along with upper income tax reductions. See Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 20 10,. Pub.L_
111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
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direct gains from these family-based reforms went to relatively
affluent married breadwinners with non-earning (or low-earning)
spouses. Lower-income families continue to face marriage
penalties from the EITC, and with incomes near or below
taxable levels their main gain from the reforms came from the
partially refundable child tax credit. 246 Expanding the fifteen
percent marital tax bracket cost twice as much as the child credit
and standard deduction changes combined. 247 Married couples
filing jointly with cash incomes greater than $100,000, in 2003
dollars, reaped seventy-three percent of the savings from the
expanded bracket. 248 Married couples earning between $40,000
and $100,000 got the remaining twenty-seven percent. 249
The average annual household tax reduction from the
marriage tax reforms, in 2003 dollars, was $385 for married
couples earning between $40,000 and $100,000, $117 for
married couples earning less than $40,000, and $827 for married
couples with incomes over $100,000.25o Less than twenty
percent of married taxpayers filing jointly had an adjusted gross
income over $100,000 in 2003,251 so although many of these
taxpayers are far from rich they are still relatively affluent. In
one projection of the 2010 distribution of the marriage tax
reforms of 2001-2004, the top fifth income group will receive an
246 Carasso & Stcuerle, supra note 6, at 162.
247 JOEL FRIEDMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, REVISED
HOUSE TAX-CUT BILL SWELLS DEFICIT AND CONTINUES LESS FAVORABLE
TREATMENT OF LOWER-INCOME COUPLES, Apr. 29, 2004, http://www.cbpp.org/
cms/index.cfmfa=view&id= 1843.
248 Id. (basing income figures on cash income, and noting that much of
this benefit for married couples with over $100,000 in joint income might be
cancelled out by the Alternative Minimum Tax, depending on how it is
modified).
249 Id.
250 Id. at tbl.2.
251 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2003 IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME,
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS BY MARITAL STATUS tbl. 1.2 (2003), available
at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/O,,id=96978,00.htm (based on
51,510,779 total returns with married filing jointly status).
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average benefit of $1064, while the next highest-income fifth
will receive an average benefit of $148. 252
While the preceding family tax reforms primarily target
support to the upper middle class, they exclude the very highest
earners. Because the reforms of 2001 through 2004 did not
expand the marital tax brackets over fifteen percent, the dual-
breadwinning marriage penalty still applies to married couples
with joint incomes over $131,450 under 2008 rates and after
personal exemptions and deductions. In addition, these higher-
eaming dual-breadwinning married taxpayers face further
penalties compared to what they would pay as two individuals
filing singly or as heads of household because some family-
based deductions and credits get phased out as incomes rise.
And for those with adjusted gross income levels beginning
at $357,700 in 2008 rates, marital tax rates shift from the partial
income-splitting scheme to a full income-stacking system that
penalizes dual-earning marriage. As a result, tax policy
eliminates aid for affluent husband care at the highest income
levels, ending the disadvantages of single status for the highest-
earning breadwinners as compared to marriage to a non-earner
or low-earner, while increasing the disadvantages of dual-
earning marriage compared to single status. At these highest
income levels, breadwinners, whether married or not, are likely
to benefit from affirmative tax support for the expenses of
producing income from capital, which-unlike the expenses of
producing human labor-tend to be excluded from taxable
income.
D. From Husband Care to Capital Care
1. Leveraging Support for Upper-Class Wealth
Far outstripping the economic value of the family tax
reforms, the 2001 through 2004 tax reforms provided substantial
tax reductions skewed to favor the rich. The 2001 reform
package reduced tax rates for high earners. These reforms, like
252 TAX POLICY CTR., EXTEND MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF, PRE-
EGTRRA BASELINE WITH AMT RELIEF, DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL TAX
CHANGE BY CASH INCOME PERCENTILE, 2010, tbl. T07-0028, Jan. 19, 2007,
http://www.taxpolicycentcr.org/numbers/displayatab.cfm?DoclD = 1431.
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the family tax reforms, were phased in gradually and were
subject to the 2010 sunset provision, which has been extended
for two additional years. For all those with incomes exceeding
the fifteen percent bracket, the law reduced the tax rates,
changing the bracket progression from twenty-eight percent to
twenty-five percent; from thirty-six percent to thirty-three
percent, and from 39.6% to thirty-five percent. 253 The current
top rate contrasts sharply to the mid-twentieth century top tax
rate of just over ninety percent that was in effect in 1948.254 The
2001 law also benefited upper-income taxpayers by gradually
eliminating the phase-out of the personal exemptions and
itemized deductions at high income levels. 255 Furthermore, that
reform package provided for gradual reduction of estate and gift
taxes, and for eliminating the estate tax in 2010.256 Finally, in the
2003 reform package, Congress reduced the tax rate on long-
term capital gains to fifteen percent, the lowest level since World
War 1I, and applied this favorable tax rate to dividends that were
previously treated as ordinary taxable income.257
With these provisions reducing taxes for upper income
breadwinners, the direct impact of the early twenty-first century
tax reforms is a dramatic upward redistribution of tax support for
income production. Analyzing the combined impact of tax
reform legislation from 2001-2006, the Tax Policy Center
determined that annual after-tax income will increase by an
average of 0.3% ($20) for taxpayers in the bottom income
quintile; 2.5% ($744) for those in the middle quintile; and 4.1%
253 See I.R.C. §1 (a) (2010) (giving marital tax table); TAX POLICY CTR.,
MAJOR ENACTED TAX LEGISLATION SINCE 2000 (2010), http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/lcgislation/2000.cfm#EGTRRA [hereinafter MAJOR
ENACTED TAX LEGISLATION].
254 LEONARD BURMAN & DEBORAH KOBES, TAX POLICY CTR.,
PREFERENTIAL CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATES (2004), available at http://
www.taxpolicycentcr.org/UploadedPDF/1000588_TaxFacts_011904.pdf
(comparing historical change in capital gains and ordinary income tax rates).
255 MAJOR EXACTED TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 256.
25 6 Id.
257 BURMAN & KOBES, supra note 257.
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($5790) for top quintile taxpayers. 258 For those with the top one-
tenth of one percent of income levels, the average increase in
after-tax income is 6.2% ($230,136).259
Taken in this context, the increased "husband care" aid
from the 2001through 2004 tax reforms served to buy off middle
class political resistance to a major tax policy shift toward
increased "aid for wealth care."260  Rather than reflecting
outdated policy lagging behind demographic change, the tax
bonus for breadwinner-homemaker households may be
particularly salient to the current times. As middle-class male
breadwinners and their caretakers become even less secure and
more squeezed in the market, policies subsidizing the
breadwinner-homemaker family may seem to offer hopefor lost
comfort and security within the home.
2. Burdening Family Breadwinning with the AMT
Another significant change in early twenty-first century tax
policy contributes to making the increased "aid for affluent
husband care" in the recent reforms an illusory, or at least shaky,
consolation prize for those left out of the shift toward "wealth
care" policies. As the recent family-based middle-class tax
reductions take effect, regular income tax is at risk of being
replaced by a "shadow tax" with special tax penalties on upper
middle class taxpayers, particularly those who are married or
who care for dependents. 261 Federal tax law's Alternative
Minimum Tax (AMT) provision requires taxpayers with adjusted
gross incomes above a certain level of exempt income to
258 GREG LEISERSON & JEFF ROHALY, TAX POLICY CENTER, THE
DISTRIBUTION OF 2001-2006 TAX CUTS, UPDATED PROJECTIONS 2-4 (2006),
available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?ID=411378
[hereinafter DISTRIBUTION OF 2001-2006 TAX CUTS] (discussing tbl. 7 using
2006 dollars). In addition to the 2001-2004 tax reform packages that included
family tax relief, 2005 legislation extended the capital gains rate reductions
through 2010).
259 Id.
260 See Zelcnak, supra note 16, at 182-84 (discussing the politics of the
tax cuts).
261 Id. at 172.
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calculate taxes under a separate system in addition to the regular
income tax, and then to pay whichever produces the higher tax
bill. 262 The AMT was established in 1969 to ensure upper
income taxpayers would not use tax credits, deductions and
other "loopholes" to avoid substantial income tax liability.263
Unlike regular income tax, the AMT's exempt income levels and
rate brackets are not indexed for inflation, contributing to an
increasing downward shift of the tax burden. AMT now applies
primarily to the upper middle-class rather than to the very rich,
and, if unchanged, it could reach substantial portions of the
middle class.264 While less than one percent of taxpayers paid
under the AMT in 2000,265 if Congress does not change
exemption levels by 2010 more than a third of taxpayers will be
subject to the AMT, 266 with two-thirds of these AMT taxpayers
having incomes between $75,000 and $200,000.267
Since 2001, Congress has regularly enacted a series of
temporary "patches" raising the level of income exempt from the
AMT to protect more moderately affluent middle-class taxpayers
from its steeper rates.268 For 2009, the exemption levels were
temporarily changed to $46,700 for single filers and heads of
262 See I.R.C. § 55 (2010).
263 Zelcnak, supra note 16, at 172; see Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (establishing AMT); see also Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (revising AMT).
264 GREG LEISERSON & JEFFREY ROHALY, TAX POLICY CTR., THE
INDIVIDUAL ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX: HISTORICAL DATA AND PROJECTIONS
(2008), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/
411703_individual amt.pdf.
265 Cong. Budget Office, The Alternative Minimum Tax, 4 REVENUE &
TAX POL'Y BRIEF, Apr. 15, 2004 at 2.
266 LEISERSON & ROHALY, supra note 267, at tbl. I.
267 Id. at 7.
268 TAX POLICY CENTER, QUICK FACTS: ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, tbl.
I (2010), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/quick-amt.cfm
(listing tax legislation and resulting exemption level changes).
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households, and $70,950 for married persons filing jointly.269
Without these "patches," the exemption amounts would fall to
$33,750 and $45,000 respectively. 270  But Congress faces
political pressure to "buy" these temporary fixes protecting the
middle class with tax and spending policies likely to primarily
benefit the upper-class. 271 For example, the AMT "fix" for 2009
was tied to reductions in proposed funds for public education
and Medicaid,272 while the 2008 AMT adjustment helped clinch
Democratic support 'for highly unpopular legislation rescuing
failing financial institutions. 273 Despite the political unpopularity
and seemingly irrational policy of maintaining an AMT system
requiring regular but temporary, incomplete and costly "fixes,"
major change in the AMT increasingly depends on politically
difficult fundamental change in the overall tax system. 274 Indeed,
it is likely that the revenue costs of repealing the AMT soon
could exceed the costs of repealing the regular income tax while
keeping the AMT. 2
75
269 I.R.C. § 55(d)(l)(a) (2010).
270 DISTRIBUTION OF 2001-2006 TAX CUTS, supra note 26 1, at 4.
271 See Leonard E. Burman, The Alternative Minimum Tax, MILKEN INST.
REV. 19 (Fourth Quarter 2007) (explaining that pork barrel spending is often
attached to AMT relief).
272 Alec MacGallis, Despite Stimulus Funds, States to Cut More Jobs,
WASH. POST (suburban ed.) May 12, 2009, at A04.
273 Cheryl V. Jackson, Illinois House Members Jackson Jr., Rush, Biggert
Change Vote On Bailout from 'No'to 'Yes', But Six Others Are Unconvinced,
CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at A6.
274 In the 2008 presidential election, both nominees' tax plans focus on
maintaining the AMT with some protections for some of the middle-class rather
than eliminating it. See LEN BURMAN ET AL., TAX POLICY CTR., AN UPDATED
ANALYSIS OF THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' TAX PLANS, REVISED
AUGUST 15, 2008, 9-10 (2008), http://www.taxpolicyccntcr org/ publications/
url.cfm?ID=411749 (describing McCain's plan for AMT reform); see also id. at
13-14 (describing Obama's AMT reforms).
275 LEISERSON & ROHALY, supra note 267 (explaining that if the regular
income tax were repealed, the AMT would replace all but a projected $51.7
billion of the revenue lost from the income tax, compared to a $87.6 billion
revenue loss if the AMT were repealed to return taxpayers to the regular income
tax system).
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For those subject to it, the AMT works to take back a large
portion of the 2001-04 tax cuts provided to the more affluent
middle-class. 276 The AMT revokes the rate reductions and the
expanded fifteen percent marital tax bracket that produced the
bulk of the middle class "marriage tax" breaks, instead imposing
two tax brackets of twenty-six percent and twenty-eight percent
without any standard deduction or personal exemptions. 277 The
AMT applies the same income brackets to married and single
taxpayers, 278 so that marital income is effectively stacked rather
than split. As a result, the AMT eliminates much of the regular
tax system's "aid for affluent husband care."
But this elimination of some marriage-based family
support measures does not mean the AMT represents a fairer and
more marriage-neutral measure of support for either
breadwinning or informal caretaking. Instead, the AMT
particularly penalizes married couples among the more affluent
middle class. Because married couples are taxed as a unit with
income-stacking rates, dual earners, even with highly unequal
earnings, are severely penalized compared to a similarly earning
single couple. Dual earning marriages are also penalized by the
structure determining the amount of income exempt from the
AMT because the amount of income allowed before the AMT
kicks in-with its higher rates-is less than one and a half times
that of a single taxpayer. 279  For example, two single
breadwinning taxpayers like Dominic and Daniela would each
get $46,700 of adjusted gross income free from AMT (under
2009 rates), for a combined exemption of $93,400. If those
276 Id. at 15, tbl. 7 (projecting that by 2010 the AMT will cancel forty
percent of the tax cuts for taxpayers with income between $100,000 and
$200,000 and seventy-one percent of the tax cuts for taxpayers with income
between $200,000 and $500,000).
277 The twenty-six percent rate applies to net income up to $175,000
beyond the exempt amounts; for income above that level, the twenty-eight
percent rate applies. LEONARD E. BURMAN, WILLIAM G. GALE & JEFFREY
ROHALY, TAX POLICY CTR., THE EXPANDING REACH OF THE INDIVIDUAL
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 3 (2005), available at http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/4 11194_expanding _reach AMT.pdf.
278 I.R.C. § 55(b)(I)(A)(i) (2010).
279 LEISERSON & ROHALY, supra note 267, at 6.
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breadwinners were married with the same income, they would
lose part of their income exemption, reducing the income
threshold at which the AMT kicks in to $70,950-a difference of
$22,450.
The AMT also penalizes middle class breadwinners with
dependents compared to similar earners with homemaking
spouses. Heads of Households lose their partial income-splitting
benefit under the AMT, both in the rates and in the level of
income exempt from the AMT. Head of Household Heather, for
example, would be subject to the AMT beginning at $46,700,
just like Single Sophia, while Breadwinner Bob's marriage to
Homemaker Hannah would allow him to shelter an additional
$24,250 in income from the AMT under 2009 exemption levels
(though he would lose his income-splitting benefit for income
subject to the AMT). On top of cancelling out much of the
2001-04 marital tax benefits, the AMT system removes personal
exemptions, a primary source of income tax support for
taxpayers providing or caring for dependents. For 2008, personal
exemptions are $3500, so a family of four could lose $14,000 of
exemptions in the AMT compared to the income tax system. In
addition, the AMT restricts the regular income tax system's
credit for dependent care expenses, though that credit has been
temporarily restored in AMT "fixes." Without an extension of
the AMT "patch" to raise the income level triggering the AMT
calculation, by 2010 the AMT would have replaced the regular
income tax system for 43.5% of tax filers with two children, and
almost half of those with three or more children. 280
While the AMT overrides much of the income tax system's
family-based tax support, it maintains special tax support for
capital owners and upper income taxpayers. First, the AMT's top
rate of twenty-eight percent is less than the regular income tax's
upper rate of thirty-five percent. Upper income taxpayers
therefore are less likely to be subject to the AMT, allowing them
to take advantage of family support provisions within the regular
income tax, although at the highest income levels some of these
phase out. Second, although the AMT originally worked to close
tax shelters for capital gains, it now works to favor capital gains
280 Id. at 5-6. The 2010 legislation extending the 2001-04 tax cut package
included a continuing patch to the AMT. Pub.L. 111-312.
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over income from labor.28' The AMT maintains the current
income tax system's preferential fifteen percent rate for capital
gains and dividend income even as it revokes tax support for
family breadwinning and caretaking.
As argued by Lawrence Zelenak, the AMT appears to work
as a back-handed way of charging the tax cuts for upper-class
"wealth care" in the early 2000s to the more affluent middle-
class. 282 In effect, the 2001-04 marriage tax reforms "bought
off' the upper middle-class with a "bad check": A tax break
structured to turn into a tax penalty as many get swept out of the
regular income tax into the AMT (at least without temporary
legislative fixes). As Zelenak explains, even with temporary
"fixes" that, in practice, spare middle-class taxpayers for now by
maintaining a broader AMT on paper, Congress can give the
appearance of higher revenue projections to defer political
confrontation over the real costs of the upper-class tax
increases. 283
IX. Toward Fair Tax Aid For Breadwinner Care
The inequitable tax system of aid for affluent husband care
-and increasingly, for wealth care-should be replaced with a
scheme that recognizes and values the caretaking and caretakers
of all workers in relation to their ability to pay. Marriage tax
reform must be guided by two general principles that cover
familiar ground but together serve as the basis for a reformed
vision of fair aid to breadwinners and their caretakers. First, joint
marital tax rates should be replaced by individual taxation of
employment income. Second, individual taxes should be more
progressive, reversing recent upper-income tax cuts that have
contributed to a system valuing development of concentrated
financial wealth over workers' human development. Building on
281' See BURMAN, GALE & ROHALY, supra note 280, at 9; I.R.C. § 55(b)(3)
(West 2010).
282 See Zelenak, supra note 16, at 174.
283 Id.; see also AVIvA ARON-DINE AND ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, WHY THE COST OF AMT RELIEF SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN ESTIMATES OF EXTENDING THE PRESIDENT'S TAX CUTS, Feb. 20,
2007, http://www.cbpp.org/2-6-07tax.htm.
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these two basic principles, tax law should aim to recognize real
rather than nominal income-shifting between breadwinners and
caretakers, and tax support for such exchanges should extend
beyond marriage.
A. Individual Filing
The advantages of replacing marriage-based tax rates with
individual filing have been a recurring subject of tax
scholarship. 284 Yet as Edward McCaffery comments, "separate
filing remains a distant dream for a small handful of feminist-
oriented reformers.1 285 The lens of "aid for affluent husband
care" can help counter the tendency to marginalize this idea in
both tax theory and in tax politics.
1. Tax Equity, Not Just Social Equity
The merits of individual filing have been obscured by the
supposed dilemma of competing equities that pit "married
couples' equality" against "marriage neutrality. '286  In the
standard theory, the concept of "income" leaves open the
question whether income should be measured at the level of the
marital unit (taxing married couples with the same total income
the same) or at the individual level (taxing individuals with the
same income the same regardless of marital status). 287 The
2M See, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study
of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 95-98
(1971); Note, supra note 193; Laura Ann Davis, A Feminist Justification for the
Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197 (1988); Amy C.
Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 241 (1997); Pamela B. Gann,
Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59
TEX. L. REV. I (1980); Komhauser, supra note 147.
285 Edward J. McCaffery, Taxs Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71, 148 (1996); see
also, Stephen D. Sugarman, What is a Family? Conflicting Messages from our
Public Programs, 42 FAM. L.Q. 231, 257-58 (2008) (noting the merits of
individual filing but concluding that such a reform remains politically unlikely).
286 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
287 See MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 24-26 (explaining this prevailing
theory but arguing for basing tax policy on social effects rather than simply on
internal logic of income taxation).
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empirical fact that many married couples, in practice, pool their
income during marriage is often taken as a good reason to
choose "married couples' equality" as the preferable unit. 288 On
the other hand, empirical evidence also casts doubt on the extent
of marital income pooling, 28 9 and of course shows that income
pooling is not unique to federally recognized marriage. Faced
with competing facts and principles, conventional tax theory
treats the choice between the two goals as a matter of subjective
social and moral considerations (such as fairness to women)
external to the tax system.2
90
Social goals and moral ideals are inevitably central to all of
tax policy. Yet this conventional understanding of family
taxation tends to construct individual filing as a uniquely vexing,
contested and subjective choice that contrasts with tax code
provisions logically derived from "neutral" tax principles. The
theory that individual filing advances the status of women, for
example, is complicated by the problem that it would benefit
some women at the expense of others, as Ann Alstott
discusses.291
But we can shed clearer light on contested social goals by
unearthing and analyzing the inescapable moral assumptions
internal to supposedly neutral tax policy principles. By
identifying "aid for affluent husband care" as the implicit policy
underlying the seemingly benign couples equality principle, the
social and political controversies about family taxation may not
be quite so intractable. From this perspective, individual filing
would not simply promote "external" social goals but instead
would apply general tax equity principles more consistently and
coherently.
288 See, e.g., Don Fullerton & Diane L. Rogers, Lifetime Versus Annual
Perspectives on Tax Incidence, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 277, 280 (1991).
289 See Motro, supra note 7, at 1523.; Komhauscr, supra note 147, at 102;
Zelenak, supra note 4, at 351-53.
29°See Bittkcr, supra note I1, at 1392,1463; MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at
24-26 (arguing that the choice of the goal of couples equality is wrong because it
leads to "massive discrimination against women").
291 Alstott, supra note 70, at 2014-15.
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2. Not Only "Secondary Earner Bias"
Tax scholar Edward McCaffery has extensively and
insightfully discussed the social harm of the marital tax system
as a problem of "secondary earner bias" that discourages market
work by wives of affluent breadwinners. 292 As McCaffery
explains, the system of joint marital taxation necessarily requires
married couples weighing the tax effects of increased income to
assume that one spouse's income is the primary baseline and that
the other's income is secondary, added on to that baseline. 293 The
secondary earner's income will be taxed at a higher marginal
rate than the baseline income in a progressive system, so that the
secondary earner's increased income will produce less marginal
gain for the couple. Considering the additional monetary
expenses of work as well as the lost time for valuable informal
domestic services, this "secondary earner bias" may rationally
discourage many spouses of relatively high-income earners from
pursuing substantial market earnings. Although the "secondary
earning bias" is formally gender neutral, McCaffery explains
that, in practice, it is likely to disproportionately apply to wives'
earnings because married women's earnings are typically lower,
meaning their earnings will typically be perceived as secondary
and more discretionary. 294
McCaffery acknowledges that individual filing would
remedy this problem of secondary eaming. Nonetheless, he
prefers a different solution that would directly target married
women for special tax support on the theory that the real
problem is not tax recognition of marriage but the tax
disincentives for formal market work by wives. 295 McCaffery's
analysis of the "secondary earner problem" leads him to frame
292 MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 19-20.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 21 (noting that married women's income is about sixty percent of
married men's income); see also Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family:
A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983,
994 (1993) (noting that married women's earnings have historically been
considered more marginal than husbands' earnings, and that men are five times
more likely to be the earers in one-eamer marriages.).
295 McCaffery supra note 297, at 994 n.36.
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the case for reform as a case for taxing married women less and
taxing married men more.2 96 This reasoning risks making
individual filing seem not only anti-marriage, but also anti-
male. 297 Even for those who share McCaffery's compelling
concern for women's workplace equality, this formulation of the
problem of family taxation and its solutions can seem to raise
difficult questions about the competing merits of women's
market work versus informal family caretaking. 298
The case for individual filing is much stronger on equity
grounds if the goal of reform is not simply to tax married women
less than married men in order to encourage wives' market work,
but rather is to replace "aid for husband care" with more
equitable, progressive tax support for the caretaking needs of all
breadwinners. By focusing primarily on married women with
discretion to choose between formal market earnings and
informal labor or leisure, policies aimed at reducing "secondary
earner bias" will seem to inequitably favor marital households
who are disproportionately white, relatively affluent and
heterosexual. Single taxpayers face even higher marginal tax
rates than married secondary earners. For example, a single
taxpayer (like Single Sophia) earning $100,000 and considering
a promotion or second job that would add $30,000 in market
income would lose $8400 of that additional income to taxes, 299
whereas a non-earning wife (like Homemaker Hannah)
considering earning $30,000 in addition to her husband's
$100,000 income would lose only $7500 to taxes (based on 2008
296 MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 277.
297 Id. at 278 (countering objections of "male-bashing").
298 Alstott, supra note 70, at 2035-36; see also Laura Kessler,
Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 21-23 (discussing black
women's informal carcgiving as resistance to exploitativc wage labor caring for
others' families); RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN
LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
299 A single camer with standard deduction and no credits with $100,000
in wage income would owe $19,472 in taxes under 2008 rates; that tax liability
would increase to $27,872 if the wage income was $130,000.
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rates with a simplified return). 300 Increased tax support for
married women would further disadvantage unmarried
dependent caretakers and unequal-earning couples who are not
in a federally-recognized marriage and are therefore excluded
from the marital income-splitting benefit.
Furthermore, the justification for replacing "aid for unpaid
affluent husband care" with tax support for "fair breadwinner
care" should not depend on incentive effects or behavior
changes. If well-off married women's greater market work
participation or well-off husbands' greater involvement in
informal caretaking requires further changes in culture or policy,
it will still be fairer to shift more of the tax burden to relatively
affluent, unequal-earning breadwinners based on their greater
ability to pay those taxes without sacrificing basic human needs.
The goal of "fair breadwinner care" is not to reduce marital
specialization of labor, but to more fairly distribute the gains and
risks of that specialization. This Article's hypothetical
comparison of Breadwinner Bob and Homemaker Hannah to
others shows not that the breadwinner-homemaker family form
is wrong but that it does not deserve special tax protection from
normal principles of progressive taxation.
B. Increasing Progressivity
Linking substantially increased progressivity to "marriage
tax reform" is crucial because the marital income splitting
system undermines tax progressivity while seeming to support it.
In principle, marital income splitting is anti-progressive, as
explained in Part 1I: it treats two people with highly unequal
incomes as if the income were redistributed more equally. In
practice, the recent expansion of marital income-splitting eased
taxes for some middle class taxpayers, providing a leaky and
narrow life raft against a rising tide of inequality swelled by the
looming AMT, upper-income tax cuts and other upwardly
redistributive spending and regulatory policies.
The pseudo-progressivity of the marital income-splitting
system should be replaced with real progressivity by adopting a
30 A married couple filing jointly with standard deduction would increase
their tax liability from $13,213 on $100,000 in wage income to $20,713 on
$130,000 in combined wage income.
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more progressive individualized rate system. If marital income
taxation were eliminated so that all breadwinners were taxed at
the current individual rates, the result would be increased
revenue from the increased taxes on breadwinners married to
non-breadwinning spouses due to the loss of their income-
splitting benefit. This revenue savings, combined with reversals
of recent tax breaks targeting wealthy households, could be
directed toward reducing taxes for breadwinners with more
modest incomes as well as for their caretakers. Tax support for
breadwinner care should be uncoupled from marriage to become
a matter of a generally progressive rate structure.
Although exact rate details are beyond the scope of this
Article, the general principle could be achieved by changes such
as expanding the individual personal exemption and standard
deduction amounts to make more initial earnings income tax-
free (phasing out at high income levels), reducing tax rates in the
lowest brackets and increasing refundable earned income credits
for low-income taxpayers. Furthermore, the AMT should be
redirected to its original progressive purpose by eliminating the
reduced rates for capital gains and dividend income, and
exchanging temporary increases in the exemption level for an
increased inflation-indexed exemption level based on individual,
not marital, income. 3 1 In addition, increased progressivity
should include raising the capital gains tax rate to reduce support
for wealth over work.
By linking tax support for "breadwinner care" to individual
income, rather than to marital status and marital division of
labor, tax policy will better capture the relationship between
personal caretaking services and ability to pay income taxes. At
the upper income levels currently favored by the marital income-
splitting system of "aid for unpaid affluent husband care,"
breadwinners have more ability to support important caretaking
needs from their own income without additional tax support-
and more ability to share their income to support others'
caretaking needs.
301 For discussion of progressive proposals to reform the AMT, see AVIVA
ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MYTHS AND REALITIES
ABOUT THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, Feb. 14, 2007, http://www.cbpp.org/
crns/ ?fa=view&id = 1063.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
Of course, recent anti-progressive tax reforms underscore
the problem that policies supporting increased progressivity run
counter to much theory that is recently prominent as well as
recently powerful politics. But linking the broad issue of
progressivity to the issue of marriage taxation could help to
question those politics and ideas. Rather than treating increased
progressivity as a question simply of class-based economic
"distribution," the framework of equitable support for
breadwinner care can help defend progressive rates as
productive support for workers and for informal family
caretaking.
The idea of better promoting care for human well-being
also can be part of a general ideological challenge to the
assumption that equal "distribution" undermines overall
economic "growth." Conventional definitions of economic
growth emphasize short-term capital concentration and
accumulation. However, the current economic crisis underscores
the illusory and insecure nature of such gains and perhaps
provides an opening for alternative measures of societal welfare.
Re-envisioning economic growth to understand the value of
caretaking for human beings could counter the general argument
that taxing capital accumulation is bad for growth. 302
Furthermore, the recent economic crisis and a changing political
context may have increased policy interest in protecting middle
class security and in economic equality more generally.
Focusing tax policy on fair support for "breadwinner care" could
help reveal the overall anti-progressivity of current marriage
taxation as well as the potential benefits for many higher-income
taxpayers, such as dual-earning married couples, from a reform
combining individual taxation with increased progressivity.
C. Breadwinner-Caretaker Income Transfers
Will individual taxation undermine progressivity by
allowing affluent primary breadwinners to shift income to lower-
taxed spouses? Joint marital filing at income-splitting rates, of
course, makes such anti-progressive spousal income-shifting
302 See Martha McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of
Efficiency, 8 AM. U..J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y, & L. 115, 137-38 (explaining that
the idea of "efficiency" as aggregate economic gain requires assumptions about
what counts in measuring aggregate gain).
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normal. To replace that "aid for husband care" with fair aid for
breadwinner care, tax reductions for "sharing" income in
exchange for caretaking should depend on substantive shifts in
income from breadwinners to caretakers.
One concern is that individual taxation would undermine
progressivity by taxing a non-earning spouse of a high-earner
the same as a person living in poverty, even though the high-
earner's spouse lives in luxury and leisure. 30 3 This problem
could be addressed by treating some marital income-sharing as
taxable gifts, following the principle of tying taxes to substantive
ownership and control. 3 4 But this problem could also be partly
mitigated by linking individual taxation to substantially
increased progressivity. The greater unfairness, arguably, is a tax
system that allows individuals with legal rights to high incomes
and extensive wealth to avoid paying for government programs
and social and physical infrastructures that contribute to their
opportunity for gain. To the extent that non-earning spouses
share the economic conditions of their upper-income
breadwinners, a change to more progressive individual taxation
could lead to less luxury spending by homemaking spouses of
affluent earners.. That result would then yield more substantive
fairness than the current system in which those non-earning
spouses nominally pay taxes as part of a marital unit for the
purpose and effect of reducing upper-income families' taxes. The
current system switching from income-splitting to income-
stacking at very high income levels limits this unfairness by
capping tax-reducing nominal income-shifting. 30 5  But the
income-stacking policy's nominal treatment of income as if it
were earned by the highest earning spouse creates a substantive
penalty on increased earnings by the lower earning spouse, a
penalty particularly burdensome for those who lack the marital
303 See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM 18-19, 160 n.10 (2000) (using the example of Bill Gates' wife to
dismiss individual taxation).
304 See Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach
to Marriage and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 759, 797-99 (2004)
(advocating separate tax treatment of spouses for federal gift and estate taxes at
high income levels as a means of increasing progressivity and other equities).
305 See supra Part III.C.2.
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power to bargain for a fair share of the marital resources and
who seek to increase their economic independence from their
spouses.
If a spouse does not share in a marital high-earner's gains
or hold independent rights to income-producing capital, a low, or
no, tax burden resulting from a change to individual taxation
arguably reflects that spouse's long-term substantive individual
economic insecurity. Indeed, it is more progressive and
consistent with the tax principles to ignore the informal partial
income-sharing of a homemaking wife of a high-earning
husband, taxing her on her individual income, than to ignore half
the formal economic gains of a high-earning husband with
homemaking wife under an income-splitting joint tax system. 306
While it is true that individualized taxation could mean that low-
earning wives of high-income breadwinners get "welfare," such
as refundable EITC credits, the current system effectively gives
many higher-earning breadwinners (typically husbands)
"welfare" via the income-splitting "aid for affluent husband
care," up to the high income level at which income-splitting
ends307
However, a shift to individual taxation would create the
problem that high-income married breadwinners with property
or business income can avoid high progressive tax rates through
marital transfers based more on appearance than reality. In
contrast, pre-tax transfers of employment income between
spouses are prohibited under a rule established prior to joint
marital taxation in 1948.308 Preserving this general rule under
individual taxation would be consistent with the tax treatment of
unmarried breadwinners or married dual-breadwinners, who also
306 See supra Part ll.B.3 (explaining that income-splitting ignores formal
market gains, not "imputed" income).
307 See supra Part lll.C.2 (discussing incomc-stacking change at very high
income levels).
308 See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. I II(1930) (ruling, under the pre-1948
system of individual marital taxation, that a husband could not reduce his taxes
by assigning half of "his" salary to his wife on the theory that this salary was
joint marital property).
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cannot deduct the cost of domestic services from income30 9 save
for limited dependent care expenses. 310 Indeed, this Article's
goal of fair support for breadwinner care aims to provide more
equitable tax recognition of the costs for workers, as well as
their caretakers, of their caretaking but to do so through
progressive taxation of individual formal market earnings rather
than through marital income-splitting.
Several measures could help mitigate the problems of tax-
favored, potentially abusive marital transfers of property and
business income while still minimizing administrative burdens
in an individualized system. Prior to 1948, federal tax treated
residence in community property states as sufficient ground for
marital income-splitting. 311 However, this approach favored
marriages with property or business income and overlooked the
lack of substantive rights of homemakers to marital income
under many such laws. 312  Instead, fairer tax support for
breadwinner care could be achieved by extending federal rules
currently governing allocation of income among family
members to ensure substantive rather than sham distribution. 31 3
In addition, tax penalties could be designed to link allocation of
income for tax purposes to long-term ownership rights. For
example, a high-income spouse could be required to repay tax
advantages, with interest, if that spouse claims a greater share of
ownership of a family business upon divorce than during a
marriage. Although the full details of such a system are beyond
the scope of this Article, I will outline two adjustments to
individualized taxation that could help more equitably and
accurately recognize substantive breadwinner-homemaker
109 See Motro, supra note 7, at 3 (explaining that marital income-splitting
cffcctivcly treats a homemaking spouse's labor as a deductible business expense
for a married primary breadwinner).
310 I.R.C. § 21 (2010).
31 See supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing the Poe v.
Scaborn ruling that federal tax law should treat marital income as equally
divided among spouses for married couples in community property states).
3 2 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
313 See Davis, supra note 287, at 246-48 (discussing possible tax rules for
evaluating marital transfers under an individualized system).
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
exchanges than the current system while improving
progressivity in general.
First, to recognize that unearned income poses particular
risks of sham marital transactions, married persons' unearned
income, distinct from wage and salary income, could be taxed at
the rate applicable to the spouse with higher earned income,
perhaps simplifying and targeting such an approach by applying
it only to persons with income above a certain threshold. If
Breadwinner Bob earns $1000 a year in interest income from
savings of his earned income, and if his earned income is above
any threshold level, it would be taxed at an individual higher tax
rate even if he shares that income with his non-earning
homemaking wife. 314 Exceptions could be made for separate
taxation of certain unearned income with documentation of
separate ownership, such as ownership of the asset prior to
marriage, or perhaps for gains from certain types of assets
particularly likely to represent shared marital contributions such
as a marital residence.
By attributing unearned marital income to the higher-taxed
primary breadwinner, this targeted modification of individual
taxation would treat married primary breadwinners as if they did
not pay for a homemaking spouse's services by transferring
assets formally produced by the breadwinner's income. In effect,
the current system withdrawing marital income-splitting and
replacing it with income stacking at high income levels makes a
similar assumption-without distinguishing among types of
income, withdrawing "aid for husband care" for wealthier
breadwinners' whose non-breadwinning spouses presumably are
more likely to provide luxury services or class status than basic
caretaking. However, unlike the current income-stacking marital
rates, this proposed allocation of marital income would not
penalize dual-breadwinning married couples for whom property
income is more likely to represent combined market gains. To
avoid disadvantaging and discouraging substantive breadwinner-
homemaker marital exchanges, this constraint on tax recognition
of marital asset transfers should be supplemented with a
311 Such a distinction between allocation of earned and unearned income
is already in place for certain narrow categories of married couples not subject to
joint taxation. Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay
Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529, 1586-87 (2008).
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mechanism for more equitably and accurately recognizing such
transfers.
A second step in protecting progressivity in an
individualized tax system is an affirmative system of tax-
recognized "caretaker accounts" modeled on existing individual
retirement accounts that provide a simplified device for targeting
tax support to substantive rather than sham exchanges of formal
market income for caretaking. This would allow a married
breadwinner, or any individual, to transfer income-producing
assets into a specially designated account structured to ensure
individual ownership by the lower-income spouse or other
person, thus allowing income in that account to be taxed at that
individual's lower rates. The amount of qualifying transfers
could be capped to prevent tax support for spousal "caretaking"
likely to involve primarily luxury services and class status.
Alternatively, withdrawals from such accounts could be
restricted to particular times or purposes, like current tax-
favored accounts for retirement, education, and medical savings,
to ensure benefits go for purposes primarily benefiting the
homemaking spouse and to minimize informal appropriation by
an exploitative spouse.
Such "caretaker accounts" could also extend tax benefits to
those dependent on earned income by providing a limited earned
income credit to those who deposit funds into such an account.
Although the tax credit would work to split some employment
income between homemakers and breadwinners, its support for
breadwinner care would be more equitable than the current
marital income-splitting system. This is because this affirmative
tax aid would depend on substantive, rather than fictional,
exchanges of formal earnings for domestic labor. Furthermore, it
could be used to support breadwinner-caretaker exchanges
regardless of marital status; to support paid market service
providers as well as unpaid family caretakers; it would provide
more progressive support for modest-income breadwinners; and
it could equally support homemaking by dual-breadwinning
couples. It could even be structured to support for "self care" by
breadwinners making deposits into their own accounts, similar
to current individual retirement accounts, thereby providing
progressive support, on top of general progressive rates, for their
own long term human capital development.
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D. Winners and Losers from More Progressive
Individual Taxation
1. Single Breadwinners
Individual filing at more progressive rates would provide
more equitable support for the caretaking needs of breadwinners
who are single or not in federally recognized marriages. In the
current system, single taxpayers effectively subsidize "affluent
husband care" by paying higher taxes than breadwinners married
to non-earning or low-earning homemakers, except at the
highest income levels. Changing to a system of more progressive
individual taxation would mean that caretaking subsidies will
instead run from upper income taxpayers to lower-income
breadwinners regardless of marital status.
Shifting tax support from unequal-earning marriages to
non-wealthy individual taxpayers-regardless of marital status
-would allow single breadwinners to increase access to
caretaking support through paid or unpaid services. For
relatively high-income single taxpayers, the steeper tax rates
would offset gains from ending the current "single's penalty"
that exempts the richest taxpayers. 3'5 The loss for affluent single
taxpayers would likely have a greater negative impact on luxury
spending and capital accumulation than on basic human
caretaking, consistent with the goal of fair support for
breadwinner care. Furthermore, even some upper-income single
filers might be persuaded that changing to more progressive
individual filing offers some protection of their long-term
interests and security, since this change would arguably tax them
more fairly in the event of income loss or marriage to another
high earner.
2. Dual Breadwinning Taxpaying Marriages
Compared to the recent reduction in the "marriage
penalty," a change to progressive individual filing would be
fairer for married dual-breadwinning taxpayers. The current
system contains a hidden penalty on breadwinner caretaking for
equal-earning taxpayers. Although dual-breadwinner marriages
315 See supra Part III.C.2.
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get tax rates equal to married one-breadwinner couples with
equal income, this superficial equality masks the fact that dual-
breadwinning marriages, like single filers, are denied the tax
support for breadwinner care that is available to taxpaying one-
breadwinner marriages. With more progressive individualized
rates replacing the current "aid for affluent husband care bonus,"
married dual-breadwinners with modest incomes would benefit
from tax reductions on both incomes. Two $50,000 earners, like
Dominic and Daniela, would each pay less in taxes under a more
progressive and individualized system, easing the current
squeeze on such typical middle-class families by freeing up
more money for paid domestic services or for cutting back on
work hours to allow for more unpaid domestic work.
3. Married Primary Breadwinners
Many married breadwinners with non-breadwinning
spouses would also gain, or at least not lose substantially, from a
shift to progressive individualized filing. Individualized filing
would mean that one-breadwinner taxpaying marriages would
lose their current "marriage bonus." But with substantially
increased progressivity, that loss could be equaled or outstripped
by a greater gain from generally reduced tax rates on modest
income earners. For example, the current system resulting from
the recent "marriage penalty" reforms provides a tax break that
ranges roughly from $1000 to just over $2500 for one-
breadwinner marriages with taxable incomes under $50,000. A
major increase -in progressivity could offset or exceed that tax
savings for modest income married taxpayers. Expanded
refundable earned income credits would particularly help
provide a net gain in caretaking support for breadwinner-
homemaker couples at the lowest-income levels.
In addition, many affluent one-breadwinner married
couples whom might gain little or nothing in the short term from
replacing their current "bonus" with increased progressivity
might nonetheless reap longer-term gains from such a change.
For some marriages with modest or moderately affluent
incomes, the one-breadwinner household labor division may be
a temporary arrangement, with their so-called "marriage bonus"
effectively serving as "aid for second breadwinner development"
or "aid for temporary dependent development." For example,
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some couples may become one-breadwinner families so that one
spouse can improve earnings capacity through job training or
higher education or an extended job search, or to allow for a
temporary period of dependent caretaking for young children, or
for family illness. For many such married couples, this period of
spousal unemployment is likely to be better supported by
progressive individual provisions that will target support both
during that spouse's period of low earnings (especially through
refundable credits) and when that spouse becomes a second
breadwinner (under more progressive tax rates). In contrast,
under the current system, a homemaking spouse's death, divorce
or increased earnings will mean a substantial tax hike for a
specialized earner like Breadwinner Bob, and this tax increase
will come just at a time when expenses and domestic needs
might also significantly increase. In short, increased
progressivity and individualized rates could provide a safety net
for moderately affluent one-breadwinner marriages that brings
long-run economic returns well worth the cost of modest short-
term tax increases.
4. Heads of Households
A substantially more progressive individual rate system-
particularly with an increased refundable earned income credit-
would provide more support to the vast majority of unmarried
breadwinners caring for dependents because such households are
particularly likely to have low or modest incomes. 31 6 While it is
true that a change to individualized filing would eliminate the
partial income-splitting benefit of the current head of household
rate, by directing support to higher incomes, marital status, and
formal dependent ties, the current system of partial income-
splitting does not adequately or equitably capture the effect of
dependent caretaking on a breadwinner's ability to pay taxes.
Like marital income-splitting, head of household income-
splitting operates as an exception to progressive rates by
providing a tax shelter with increased value to increased
earnings that is subject to a relatively modest income cap. Like
the current marital tax shelter, in the bigger picture this income-
splitting also cushions the burdens on some middle income
316 See supra Part I1.C.2.
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taxpayers of a tax system that is not very progressive, thereby
offering some semblance of progressivity to the particularly
burdened group of middle income taxpayers who are unmarried
with dependents. Increased progressivity would provide more
equitable and meaningful tax support for heads of households by
compensating for the effects of dependent care on market
earnings. With that change, breadwinners get more support to
the extent that they sacrifice market earnings to devote time and
energy to dependent care, or, alternatively, to the extent that their
earnings require difficult tradeoffs between paid dependent care
and other basic spending needs. In contrast, the current head of
household rates give unmarried breadwinners with dependents
more tax support as they earn more (up to the income cap).
In addition, directing tax support by income level rather
than by marital status would avoid the problem that the current
head of household system excludes many breadwinners whose
dependent caretaking reduces their earning and spending
capacity. In the current system, a dependent-caretaking
breadwinner who marries another breadwinner with relatively
equal and modest earnings will lose the income-splitting benefit
from filing as a "head of household" without gaining a marital
income-splitting benefit. By providing equal support to married
and unmarried breadwinners with dependent caretaking
responsibilities, the suggested change to progressive
individualized rates would recognize that lower and modest
income married breadwinners with dependents may also
sacrifice market earnings or spending capacity for dependent
care.
A switch to tax support from a more progressive individual
rates rather than head of household status will similarly allow an
unmarried dependent caretaker to get support for a number of
different caretaking options. The current head of household rate
system makes formal ties to dependents the key to the
breadwinner's tax shelter. Instead of making formal market
income the key to breadwinner's tax support, more progressive
individual rates would recognize that many of those who
sacrifice market earnings to provide dependent care do not have
such formal ties. For example, an unmarried breadwinner's
domestic partner or the father of a non-marital child might
accommodate job opportunities or work hours to provide
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informal caretaking for a dependent, yet only the head of
household in the current system would receive substantial tax
support for that care.
Nonetheless, the switch to progressive individual rates
would not in itself be sufficient to equitably address the affect of
dependents on ability to pay taxes. The current system's use of
marital status as a proxy for tax support for dependents conflates
dependent care and non-dependent caretaking, and treats both
groups inequitably and inadequately. Changing to a more
equitable system of breadwinner caretaking could help to bring
public attention to the need for a more equitable and direct
system of tax support for dependent care. Dependents affect a
family's ability to pay taxes in a way that is distinct from non-
eamers who provide services that are unpaid or compensated
only informally. For example, dependents add expenses without
producing offsetting economic gain (at least in the short run),
and they are also persons in need of substantial daily labor and
time from others. A more progressive, individualized tax system
would be a step toward the goal of providing more equitable
support for what Martha Fineman has identified as the
"derivative dependency" of those who sacrifice their own market
earnings-as well as personal caretaking and leisure-to provide
informal dependent care. 317
This support could be complemented with a system of
expanded and refundable credits for dependent care expenses
allocated to individual taxpayers. A change to individual filing
raises the question how to simply and equitably divide
dependent credits among parents or other joint caretakers. Yet
expanding non-marital default rules, such as household
residency, that are already in place may be fairer than the current
marital system, especially combined with more progressive
individual rates that would reduce taxes for many who combine
earning with dependent caretaking.
Furthermore, the goal of providing "fair aid for
breadwinner care" rather than "aid for affluent husband care"
emphasizes support for human development, as a central goal of
an income tax system based on ability to pay. By more fairly
317 FINEMAN, supra note 12 1, at 162.
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recognizing the economic, personal and social value of human as
well as capital growth, we can provide better ground to support
expanded recognition of dependent care as well.
5. Breadwinners' Diverse Care Choices
By channeling tax support for work and family through
general progressive rates rather than through a targeted subsidy
for a particular family structure, this proposed "breadwinner
care" tax policy purposefully accommodates diverse answers to
the complex question of what should count as valuable
"caretaking." A modest-earning breadwinner whose taxes are
reduced by more progressive rates might, for example, use her
tax savings to reduce her own formal market work somewhat,
perhaps by choosing to quit a second job, to allow for more time
for her own informal homemaking or personal caretaking.
Alternatively, she could use that tax savings to increase her
spending on paid domestic services without sacrificing other
spending or savings. Or, she could share that extra money in
exchange for informal caretaking help. That informal caretaking
could come not just from a non-earning spouse, but also from a
breadwinning spouse who combines earning and homemaking,
an older relative retired from formal labor but not disabled from
domestic labor, a cohabiting domestic partner or same-sex
spouse, or relative or friend who is unemployed or
underemployed in the formal market.
Alternatively, a modest-earning breadwinner could use
reduced taxes to do without domestic services, such as a clean
and organized house or good meals, and instead increase
financial support to family members in another country or
retirement savings, or to spend more on recreation with friends,
consumer goods such as a better car or household appliances, or
to replace some market earnings with community volunteer
work. All of these choices could serve to nurture the present or
future social, emotional, economic and physical capacities of the
breadwinner, along with the caretaking needs of his or her
family or community. Although any of these choices could, in
some circumstances, be construed as destructive to the
breadwinner or to her family and community, the goal of
incorporating breadwinner care into principles of tax equity is
not to supervise actual behavior but to better measure theoretical
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
ability to pay, considering breadwinners' need for caretaking
services. Progressive rates do not guarantee that the person
earning $10,000 a year indeed spends more money on basic
necessities rather than on harmful addictions, but instead
recognizes that in general a person earning $10,000 has
proportionately less capacity than a person earning $100,000 a
year to share income with the public without risking sacrifices in
basic necessities. Similarly, by increasing progressivity to also
recognize that the first dollars of earned income require
proportionately more personally and socially valuable caretaking
services, progressive rates do not guarantee the amount or
quality of actual caretaking.
6. Family Caretakers
Progressive, individualized taxation could overcome the
perceived conflict between support for women as informal
caretakers and support for women as market earners.
Furthermore, the change from marital to individual taxation does
not depend on a normative preference for individualistic, market
gain, but instead could work to better support and encourage
informal cooperative sharing within family and community. The
goal of fair support for breadwinner caretaking can be a means
of valuing a diversity of breadwinners and a diversity of
caretakers, whether or not their work is commodified as market
labor.
With more progressive individual taxation, the
paradigmatic homemaking wife-and others specializing in
informal labor-would pay at low tax rates on the income to
which they have formal ownership, and perhaps even qualify for
refundable affirmative tax support. Those specialized
homemakers married to breadwinners above low-income levels
would lose the "bonus" from current marital income-splitting
(assuming those homemakers share in their spouse's monetary
gains). But, by linking substantially increased progressivity to
individual taxation, many homemakers with income-pooling
breadwinner spouses could nonetheless benefit more over the
long term from replacing the superficial tax support of the
"marriage bonus" with lower tax rates on modest income,
especially given the risks of death, disability, divorce and
breadwinner income loss.
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In addition to bringing joint gains to many less affluent
breadwinner-homemaker families, individual taxation with
enhanced progressivity could benefit informal caretakers by
shifting tax support to substantive income sharing. In marriages
where the breadwinner retains primary control over marital
spending or marital gains, the change could increase security for
the low-earning caretaking spouse by giving her formal legal
title to a refundable credit or to reduced tax liability and perhaps
also the benefit of an individual "caretaker account." A
breadwinner would no longer get a tax advantage for using
unpaid homemaking services to increase unshared income and
assets, and instead would face increased tax liability-at
progressive rates-on any increased market gains from the value
of a caretaker's informal services. Additionally, in the case
where a specialized homemaker fears exploitation from a
breadwinning spouse, individualized taxation would mean the
homemaker might increase her own market earnings or even
divorce without being subject to the steeper marginal tax rates
on secondary earners within marriage or on single earners
outside of marriage.
Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV.C, more progressive
individual taxation could increase incentives for married high-
earners to formally transfer legal rights to income from property
or family business to a caretaking spouse. Nonetheless, as Ann
Alstott has astutely discussed, tax incentives for formal legal
income-sharing provide imperfect protection from exploitation
of homemakers by breadwinning spouses, because formal title to
income can often be trumped by informal power of an abusive
spouse---especially one with formal title to greater income and
assets.3 18 Although individual taxation will not fully address the
economic inequities facing informal family caretakers, increased
incentives for formal income-sharing would provide more
economic protection to caretaking spouses than the current
system, which encourages concentration of formal control and
formal gains in the breadwinner, thereby enhancing both formal
and informal advantages of the breadwinning compared to the
caretaking spouse.
38 Alstott, supra notc 70, at 2029-30.
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CONCLUSION
By replacing the implicit policy of "aid for affluent
husband care" with the goal of fair support of caretaking for
breadwinners, the tax system could more equitably distribute
resources among families and among individual breadwinners.
An individualized, more progressive tax scheme would better
support the caretaking services on which all workers depend,
and would also better support family caretakers themselves,
while more equitably recognizing the diverse, complex and
variable family forms of this caretaking.
Reorienting tax support from "husband care" to
"breadwinner care" could also help promote a view of family
caretaking that goes beyond individualized private relationships,
particularly the marital family, to broader economic and legal
structures that help both families and workers flourish or
flounder.319 By analyzing the longstanding tax preference for
"affluent husband care," and thereby revealing some of the
extensive but highly inequitable public support provided for
some people's breadwinning and caretaking, this Article
contributes to criticisms of the idealized self-sufficient family as
a myth. 320 Openly acknowledging the tax system's support for
family and work, and making it more equitable, could contribute
toward building a vision that recognizes effective support for
breadwinners and caretakers requires spending collective
resources to enhance public resources. The long term savings
from public investments in, for exa mple, health care, public
transit systems, cleaner air or better enforcement of laws
protecting against crime, discrimination or consumer fraud, may
be as important to supporting workers and families as saving
private resources through tax reductions.321 By reaffirming truly
progressive taxation in place of the pseudo-progressivity of
319 See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 37-40, 263-91 (2004)
(discussing the importance of collective structurcs of support for family care).
320 Id. at 20-22 (explaining and critiquing autonomy as a myth
fundamental to American policy).
321 See Case, supra note 96 (noting advantages of support for family
caretaking through enhanced public services rather than special parental
privileges).
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recent marriage tax reforms, tax reforms aimed at fair support
for breadwinner caretaking could help point the way toward a
society that truly values workers and families at home, in public
policy and in the market.
